











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission.  
JOINT CENTER  
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES 
 
 






Related Publication 06-04 
February 2006 
 
                                                           
∗ Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Abby Wright for superb 
research assistance.  
1
  W ELFARE POLLS: A SYNTHESIS 
 
Matthew D. Adler
*, University of Pennsylvania Law School, February 2006. 
 
Abstract: “Welfare polls” are survey instruments that seek to quantify the determinants of 
human well-being.  Currently, three “welfare polling” formats are dominant: contingent-
valuation surveys, QALY surveys, and happiness surveys.   Each format has generated a 
large, specialized, scholarly literature, but no comprehensive discussion of welfare polling 
as a general enterprise exists.  This Article seeks to fill that gap.   
 
Part I describes the trio of existing formats.  Part II discusses the actual and potential uses 
of welfare polls in government decisionmaking.  Part III analyzes in detail the obstacles 
that welfare polls must overcome to provide useful well-being information, and concludes 
that they can be genuinely informative.  Part IV synthesizes the case for welfare polls, 
arguing against two types of challenges: the revealed-preference tradition in economics, 
which insists on using behavior rather than surveys to learn about well-being; and the civic-
republican tradition in political theory, which accepts surveys but insists that respondents 
should be asked to take a “citizen” rather than “consumer” perspective.  Part V suggests 





I.  WELFARE POLLS: EXISTING FORMATS  (CVS, QALYS, HAPPINESS SURVEYS) 
 
II.  CURRENT AND POSSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL USES 
  Cost-Benefit Analysis 
  Happiness-Based Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 Alternative  Policy  Analysis 
  Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
  Damages, Fines, Prices, Taxes 
  Environmental Impact Statements and Rulemaking Notices 
  Other Governmental Communications 
 
III. DO WELFARE POLLS PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION ABOUT WELL-BEING? 
  Moral and Other Disinterested Preferences 
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 Truthtelling 
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IV. WELFARE POLLS: A DEFENSE 
  Weak Welfarism and the Need for Welfare Information 
  The Revealed Preference Objection to Welfare Polling 
  The Deliberative Democracy Objection 
  








What are the avenues for citizen participation in the administrative state?  The traditional 
answers have familiar flaws.  Agency adjudications may be accompanied by oral hearing rights for 
the targeted individuals,
1 who will typically have strong incentives to exercise those rights. But 
agencies, with rare exceptions, need not conduct oral hearings when they issue regulations or 
undertake other general decisions
2 – and, in any event, trial-like process in these cases could be 
expected to generate low and unrepresentative citizen participation, given free rider problems.   
 
Free rider problems also beset the participatory mechanisms that do currently accompany 
rulemakings.  Citizens can lobby their legislators, who in turn can pressure administrators; they can 
join the notice-and-comment process that agencies are required to conduct for most legally binding 
rules, sending written comments that the agency will be required to read and address;
3 they can 
show up and talk at the informal public meetings that agencies often hold prior to the promulgation 
of important regulations.
4  But in each case the rational-apathy dynamic will set in.  Most 
individuals reasonably expect to have little chance, via the mechanisms just described, of changing 
the outcome of the administrative decision.  Thus they do better by remaining uninvolved.  Those 
who do become involved will be a self-selected, statically “biased” sample of the public; and they 
will tend to be uninformed and to make relatively little effort to understand the issues at hand.
5 
 
These are not novel observations, of course, and much recent scholarly work has been 
undertaken that contemplates innovative participatory devices – devices to produce citizen 
involvement in administrative decisionmaking that is better informed, more thorough, and 
representative of the citizenry as a whole.   Most of this scholarship is inspired by the “deliberative 
                                                 
1 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 529-43 (4
th ed. 2002) 
2 See id. at 415-24. 
3 See id. at 424-63. 
4 On agency use of informal public meetings, see, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participation and Environmental 
Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 226, 230-31 (1990). 
5 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 423 (2005) 
(summarizing skeptical literature on notice-and-comment rulemaking).  To be sure, some citizens do participate in 
rulemakings, and sometimes their comments are quite sophisticated.  See id. at 468-72, 486-89.  But these facts are 
consistent with the propositions that participants are self-selected, rather than a randomly selected sample of the public, 
and that even those who participate are not generally very informed.   
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democracy” or civic republican tradition in political theory.
6  The tradition envisions a particular 
kind of citizen participation: public-spirited, concerned to advance the public good rather than 
personal preferences or interests.  A variety of concrete formats have been proposed for civic-
republican citizen deliberation: citizen advisory committees or review panels, citizen juries, 
“deliberative polling.”
7   
 
But federal agencies have shown little interest in the deliberative democrats’ proposals.  
Advisory committees are frequently convened, but (at least at the federal level) usually consist of 
technical experts or interest group representatives rather than ordinary citizens.
8 Citizen jury and 
deliberative polling formats are more ambitious than citizen advisory committees --  requiring a 
highly structured process, led by convenors, whereby representative citizens become informed, 
deliberate, and then vote or state their views.  These formats have been used only very occasionally 
by U.S. governmental entities, state or federal.
9 
 
This Article takes a different tack.  It describes a set of participatory devices that are much 
more widespread in actual governmental practice than the formats proposed by deliberative 
democrats, yet have eluded sustained theoretical attention. I will call these “welfare polling 
formats,” or “welfare polls” for short, to be contrasted with “policy deliberation formats” such as 
citizen juries, citizen panels, or deliberative polls.   
 
“Welfare polls” ask ordinary citizens about well-being, not policy.  Citizens are not asked 
for their all-things-considered views about what government should do.  Rather, they are posed 
questions that will help measure the impacts of governmental choices on a scale of human well-
being.  These well-being questions are, in crucial ways, narrower and less ambitious than those 
contemplated by the deliberative democrats.  They do not ask citizens to bracket their own interests 
                                                 
6 The literature on civic republicanism and deliberative democracy is vast.  For representative contributions, see Cass 
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON 
REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., 1997). 
7 James Fishkin is a leading proponent of “deliberative polling.”  See JAMES S. FISHKIN: THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: 
PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995); James S. Fishkin, Toward Deliberative Democracy: Experimenting with an 
Ideal, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol E. Soltan eds., 1999); 
Robert Luskin et al., Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 455 (2002).  Ned 
Crosby is a leading proponent of “citizen juries.”  See Ned Crosby, Using the Citizens Jury Process for Environmental 
Decision Making, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 401 (Ken Sexton et al. eds., 1999); 
Ned Crosby, Citizens Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental Questions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE: 
EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 157 (Orwin Renn et al. eds., 1995); Ned Crosby et al., 
Citizens Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation, 46 PUBLIC ADMIN. REVIEW 170 (1986).  Other scholarship 
on citizen advisory committees, citizen juries, deliberative polling, and similar formats includes: ANNA COOTE & JO 
LENAGHAN, CITIZENS JURIES: THEORY INTO PRACTICE (1997); FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE, supra; THE POLL WITH A 
HUMAN FACE: THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION EXPERIMENT IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION (Maxwell McCombs 
& Amy Reynolds eds., 1999);  Jonathan Aldred, Citizens and Wetlands: Evaluating the Ely Citizens’ Jury, 34 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 217 (2000); John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards 
in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 INDIANA L.J. 904 (1998); Thomas Brown et al., The Values Jury to Aid Natural 
Resource Decisions, 71 LAND ECON. 250 (1995); Wendy Kenyon et al., Citizens’ Juries: An Aid to Environmental 
Valuation? 19 ENVT. & PLANNING C: GOV’T AND POLICY 557 (2001). 
8 See Applegate, supra note 7, at 925. Citizen advisory committees appear to be somewhat more widely used in the 
states.  See Frances M. Lynn & Jack D. Kartez, The Redemption of Citizen Advisory Committees: A Perspective from 
Critical Theory, in FAIRNESS AND COMEPTENCE, supra note 7, at 87, 88-90. 
9 On the use of citizen juries, see Crosby, Using the Citizens Jury Process, supra note 7, at 404.   On deliberative polls, 
see Luskin et al., Considered Opinions, supra note 7, at 461.  
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and preferences; they do not ask citizens to take a stance about the appropriate goals of 
government, for example about the tradeoff between equity and efficiency, or welfare and rights.  
“Welfare polls” start from the premise that welfare matters to governmental choice; citizens are 
brought into the conversation, not to interrogate this premise, to rethink normative fundamentals, 
but rather (more narrowly) to help determine what exactly well-being means.  
 
Welfare polls can use a variety of metrics, and can inquire about different aspects of 
welfare.  Currently three specific formats are dominant: contingent-valuation (“CV”) surveys, 
which ask citizens for money valuations, and have been applied to value fatality risks, health, 
psychological states, recreation, environmental goods, artistic and cultural goods, and virtually 
every other aspect of welfare; QALY surveys, which ask citizens
10 to rank health states on a 
nonmonetary scale with 1 representing perfect health and 0 death; and happiness surveys, which 
ask citizens to rank their own “happiness” or “life satisfaction” on various nonmonetary scales. 
11 
 
Each of these techniques has generated vast scholarly literatures.
12  Further, the results of 
CV surveys and, increasingly, QALY surveys play a substantial role in agency policy analysis.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Army Corps of Engineers, the Forest Service, 
and a number of other federal agencies that regulate health, safety, or environmental hazards, or 
fund projects with environmental impacts, have long relied on the results of CV surveys in cost-
benefit analyses.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has pioneered the practice of 
incorporating QALY-based valuations into cost-benefit analysis – taking a QALY valuation of a 
health state and translating that into a dollar figure through a conversion factor. Pursuant to 
regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), CVs are currently employed for purposes of natural 
resource damage assessments.  They are also used by various agencies in preparing “environmental 
impact statements” under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
 13 
 
Happiness surveys, the third leg of the welfare-polling triad, have yet to play the role in 
U.S. governmental practice that CV surveys and QALY surveys do.  But plausible scholarly 
proposals for “happiness” based policy analysis have been advanced.  In any event, it is clear that 
some of the main “welfare polling” formats (CV and QALY surveys) already figure importantly in 
administrative decisionmaking – much more so than the policy deliberation formats favored by 
deliberative democrats – and that the potential role of welfare polls is yet larger.   
 
  So why hasn’t anyone written about welfare polls?  More precisely, why hasn’t anyone 
written about welfare polling as such?  There is plenty of writing about QALYs, about CVs, about 
happiness surveys.  Each of these particular techniques has generated a vast outpouring of primary 
and secondary work.  But the writing almost always focuses on a particular kind of welfare poll, 
rather than seeing QALY, CV, and happiness surveys as instantiations of a more general category; 
and it is almost always done by applied economists rather than political, legal or moral theorists.  
                                                 
10 As clarified below, QALY surveys are sometimes administered to doctors or other health care professionals, but 
citizen surveys are also common. See infra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
11 See infra Part I (describing these formats). 
12 See infra notes 18, 22, 28. 
13 See infra Part II (describing use of CVs and QALYs by federal agencies).  
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No one has described and evaluated welfare polls as a generic structure for citizen participation in 
governance.  
 
Why not?  Political, legal and moral theorists tend not to be welfarists.  Economists, who 
are welfarists, tend to be more interested in modeling and measurement than in political, legal, or 
moral theory.  Some administrative law scholars are welfarists – but the ones who care most about 
citizen participation often are not, and assume that the novel forms of participation worth 
discussing should be modeled on the civic-republican ideal. 
 
So welfare polling has slipped under the theoretical radar.  This Article aims to redress that.   
Part I describes the existing polling techniques:  CV surveys, QALY surveys, and happiness 
surveys.   Part II surveys the range of contexts in which these techniques currently inform 
decisionmaking by administrative agencies, and suggests other possible uses.  
  
Part III examines a range of technical, but critical, problems in designing welfare polls.  
Welfare pollsters, like their civic-republican counterparts, need to overcome the obstacle of 
rational apathy.  More generally, there are a range of valuational and communicative conditions 
that must be fulfilled for welfare polls to have substantial informational content.  Respondents 
must be sufficiently well informed; their preferences must not be distorted; they must be focused 
on well-being (i.e., self-interested); they must engage in mental effort; they must understand the 
question asked; they must answer the question truthfully, or at least in a way that is correlated with 
the truthful answer; and they must constitute a representative sample of the public at large.   
These conditions pose critical, practical problems, for those who conduct welfare polls.  Even more 
fundamentally, they are critical to a normative evaluation of welfare polling as a practice. 
  
That evaluation is undertaken in Part IV.  Synthesizing the material from previous parts, I 
provide a normative case for welfare polls, grounded in the moral and legal relevance of well-
being.   Part IV argues, against the revealed preference tradition in welfare economics, that social 
planners have reason to rely on surveys and not just behavior in estimating individual valuations; 
and, against the deliberative-democratic tradition in political theory, that these surveys need not 
always ask citizens to put on the hat of policymaker.  Welfare polling complements, rather than 
displaces, policy deliberation formats. The two get at different kinds of citizen judgment, rather 
than being mutually exclusive. 
 
  Part V looks to the future.  It describes a variety of novel formats with which welfare 
pollsters should experiment.  The trio of CV, QALY, and happiness surveys will surely remain 
dominant for some time, but should be supplemented with new approaches. 
 
   
I. WELFARE POLLS: EXISTING FORMATS (CVS, QALYS, HAPPINESS SURVEYS) 
  
  Welfare polls or surveys, as I conceptualize them, have a number of defining features.  The 
respondents are lay people, not experts.  The respondents are not queried about their policy views 
or moral judgments, but instead are asked to evaluate some human’s life, or a change in some 
human’s life (the respondent’s own life, or someone else’s), with respect to well-being. And, the 
respondents are invited to express this judgment quantitatively, in terms of some numerical scale.  
6
  
This highlights what is both distinctive and normatively attractive about certain existing 
survey practices, namely CV, QALY, and happiness surveys.  At the same time, it leaves much 
room for experimentation and improvement.  What information should respondents be given? How 
should they be debiased?  Should they be asked to think about their answers solo, or to deliberate 
together about well-being?  What scale should be used?  
 
These sorts of questions will be examined below, in Part III and again in Part V.  The 
current welfare-polling formats may be far from optimal.  Still, it is important to see that the 
project of welfare polling is not a utopian one.  The project is already well underway, with CV, 
QALY, and happiness surveys the leading examples. 
 
  CV surveys were invented by environmental economists in the 1960s.
14  They are now 
conducted, not just for ecological goods, but for virtually every aspect of well-being: recreation, 
noise, smell, visibility, fatality risks, health states, psychological states, cultural amenities, and 
aesthetic values.  Respondents are selected members of the citizenry or some subset of the 
citizenry, for example the population that uses some amenity or that is exposed to some hazard – 
randomly or nonrandomly selected, depending on the study design.
15 Mail, telephone, and in-
person surveys are all common,
16 and the rise of the internet has created yet another possible way 
to administer CV surveys.  Surveys are typically undertaken by academic researchers, usually 
applied economists, or by governmental agencies or contractors working for agencies.   
 
It is estimated that thousands of CV surveys have been undertaken.
17  The secondary 
literature is correspondingly large.




  CV surveys employ a monetary scale of well-being. The basic thrust of the methodology is 
to get the respondent to imagine some change in the world that affects her well-being, and to 
                                                 
14 Good reviews of the CV technique include: IAN BATEMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED 
PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002) [hereinafter ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE 
TECHNIQUES] ; ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE 
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989); A. MYRICK FREEMAN, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS 161-87 (2003); Kevin Boyle, Contingent Valuation in Practice, in 
PATRICIA CHAMP ET AL., A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION 111 (2003).  Two important anthologies are VALUING 
ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US, EU, 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds., 1999); and CONTINGENT VALUATION: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993).  Helpful recent literature reviews are: L. Venkatachalam, The 
Contingent Valuation Method: A Review, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASS. REV. 89 (2004); and Richard T. Carson et al., 
Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence, 19 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMICS 173 (2001). 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 195-198. 
16 See ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, supra note 14, at 89-111; Patricia Champ, 
Collecting Survey Data for Nonmarket Valuation, in CHAMP ET AL., supra note 14 , at 59, 69-80. 
17 See Stale Navrud & Gerald J. Pruckner, Environmental Valuation-To Use or Not to Use?, 10 ENVT’L & RESOURCE 
ECON. 1, 8 (1997).  
18 See Wiktor L. Adamowicz, What’s It Worth? An Examination of Historical Trends and Future Directions in 
Environmental Valuation, 48 AUSTRALASIAN J. AG. & RESOURCE ECON. 419, 420-25 (2004). 
19 See V. Kerry Smith, JEEM and Non-market Valuation: 1974-1998, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 351 (2000) 
(discussing role of that journal in developing non-market valuation, particularly contingent valuation).  
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determine how much she is willing to pay for that change (if it benefits her) or how much she 
would be willing to accept in return for it (if it harms her).   
 
CV researchers have devised various ways to elicit monetary valuations.  The simplest and 
oldest technique is to ask “How much are you willing to pay (or accept) in return for ____?”   One 
variation on this technique presents the respondent with a series of “payment cards,” displaying 
different sums of money, and asks her to point to the card that shows the amount she is willing to 
pay or accept.  Or, in the so-called “auction” format, the respondent is presented with an initial 
“bid” amount (“Would you be willing to pay at least __?”), and that amount is increased until the 
respondent says no.  The simplest technique is quite cognitively demanding; the payment card 
approach helps, but the cognitive load is still substantial; the auction technique leads respondents 
to anchor on the initial bid.   Thus many researchers now favor yet a different approach, which is to 
present each respondent with a single “dichotomous choice” question  -- “Are you willing to pay 
$X for __?” – varying the $X amounts among the survey group, and using econometric techniques 
to estimate an average valuation from the pattern of responses.
20  
 
  Readers familiar with the CV approach may object to my characterization of CV surveys as 
welfare-focused.   Current practice is to ask respondents for their willingness-to-pay or –accept 
(WTP/WTA) for various outcomes, given the totality of their preferences.  Typically no effort is 
made to screen out moral, altruistic, or otherwise disinterested preferences.   Isn’t it, therefore, 
more accurate to characterize CVs as a weird kind of policy survey, rather than a welfare poll?   
The answer to this important objection is that CV surveys are effectively welfare focused when 
used to value goods (such as recreation, smell, noise, health, psychological states or fatality risks) 
where self-interested preferences predominate – by contrast with environmental “nonuse” values.  
Further, the CV methodology might in the future incorporate discursive techniques to screen out 
disinterested preferences.  These points are developed in Part III.
21 
  
  QALYs were invented by public health scholars in the 1970s and are now a cornerstone of 
research both in that field, and in the related field of health economics.
22   Unlike CV surveys, 
which are applicable to all types of welfare impacts, QALYs only measure health effects – 
although researchers often adopt an inclusive definition of health, encompassing pain, emotional 
distress, and mental handicaps as well as physical changes.
23 
 
QALY surveys ask respondents to place a given health state on a zero-one scale, with zero 
representing death and one perfect health.  These surveys are sometimes given to experts (namely, 
doctors) but expert surveys are now viewed skeptically in the field,
24 and QALY surveys of 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of CV elicitation techniques, see ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, 
supra note 14, at 135-45; Boyle, supra note 14, at 135-43. Variations on the straight dichotomous choice question have 
also been developed, for example the “one-and-a-half” and “double bounded” dichotomous choice formats.  See 
ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, supra note 14, at 141. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 98-108. 
22 For overviews of the QALY method, see Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 1 n.1 (2006) (citing sources).  On the size of the QALY literature, see id. at 3. 
23 See id. at 48-50. 
24 See Paul Dolan, Whose Preferences Count?, 19 MED. DECISIONMAKING 482, 482 (1998); G. Ardine de Wit, 
Sensitivity and Perspective in the Valuation of Health Status: Whose Values Count?, 9 HEALTH ECON. 109, 110 
(2000).  
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laypersons (either patients or members of the general public) are the preferred technique
25 – hence 
my categorization of QALYs as a kind of “welfare poll.”  Like CV surveys, these can be done in 
person, by phone, through the mail, or using the internet.
26  A number of standard techniques are 
used for eliciting QALY rankings: the time-tradeoff method (where the respondent contemplates 
the prospect of living a certain amount of time T* in the health state, and is then asked to determine 
the amount of time T0 such that she would be indifferent between living T* in the health state and 
living T0 in perfect health); the standard gamble method (where the respondent is asked for the 
probability p that makes her indifferent between living a given amount of time in the health state, 
and a lottery with probability p of living in perfect health for the same amount of time and 1-p of 
dying instantly); and a simple rating task, which instructs the respondent to rank the state on a scale 
of 0 to 100.
27  
 
  Let us turn, finally, to happiness surveys.
28  The U.S. General Social Survey, conducted 
annually or biannually for more than 30 years, surveys a large random sample (1500 or so) of the 
U.S. population about a range of topics.  Since its inception, it has included the following question: 
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very 
happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”
29   A parallel large-scale survey conducted several times a 
year in European Union member states, the Eurobarometer series, asks “On the whole are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”
30 Similar 
questions have been asked in a host of nonperiodic surveys, conducted by academics, governments, 
or by other organizations, in the U.S. and elsewhere, often involving very large samples.
31  The 
general format is to ask respondents to express their “happiness” or “satisfaction” with their life (or 
perhaps some aspect of their life) on a numerical scale, such as a scale from 1-3, 1-7, or 1-10; or to 
subsume their happiness or life-satisfaction in one of an ordered set of categories (“very satisfied,” 
“fairly satisfied,” “not at all satisfied”). 
32 
 
                                                 
25 See Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health-Related Quality of Life for Use in Resource Allocation Decisions in 
Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1723, 1738-39 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000) 
26 See, e.g., J. Brazier et al., A Review of the Use of Health Status Measures in Economic Evaluation, 3 HEALTH TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, no. 9, at 114-32 (1999) (listing numerous QALY surveys, including both interviewer- and self-
administered studies) 
27 On QALY elicitation methods, see J. Brazier et al., supra note 26, at 23-56 (1999); Dolan, supra note 24, at 1732-
37.  
28 For overviews of happiness surveys and the literature they have generated, see BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, 
HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT HUMAN WELL-BEING (2002); Ed Diener 
et al., Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 276 (1999); Richard M. Ryan & Edward 
L. Deci, On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52 
ANN. REV. PSYCH. 141 (2001); Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental 
Processes and their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 61 
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).  
29 See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 
1359, 1363-66 (2004); GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972-2002: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK vi, 179 (Nat’l Opinion 
Research Center, University of Chicago, February 2003). 
30 See Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 29, at 1367-69; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/description_en.htm. 
31 See Frank M. Andrews & John P. Robinson, Measures of Subjective Well-Being, in MEASURES OF PERSONALITY 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES 61, 65-68 (John P. Robinson et al. eds., 1991); Michael Argyle, Causes and 
Correlates of Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 28, at 353, 353. 
32 See Andrews & Robinson, supra note 31, at 70-73.  
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Psychologists pioneered happiness research, and have undertaken most of these surveys, as 
well as generating much of the secondary literature on happiness.  But happiness has recently 
become a hot topic in economics, and there is now a large and growing body of work by 
economists that analyzes the surveys to identify and quantify the determinants of happiness, 




II. WELFARE POLLS: CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL USES 
 
  Some intellectual tools that are influential in the academy never make it into the public 
sector.  Welfare polls are not like that.  This Part surveys their current governmental uses and 
interweaves a discussion of potential uses.  My focus here is federal agencies, and to that extent is 
underinclusive, not including state governments,
34 to say nothing of governments abroad.
35 
 
Current Use: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
   Since the days of President Reagan, federal executive agencies have been required by 
Presidential order to perform full-blown cost-benefit analyses of major rules, for review by OMB, 
and to conform all regulations to a cost-benefit standard where statutorily permissible.
36 
Traditionally, the money valuations of goods employed by cost-benefit analysis were derived using 
“revealed preference” techniques, which look to market prices or non-transactional behaviors.  
However, as elaborated in Part IV, these techniques are far from perfect,
37 and agencies now 
regularly incorporate the results of CV surveys into cost-benefit analysis.   
 
  In particular, EPA routinely relies upon CV surveys in conducting cost-benefit analysis as 
part of rulemaking -- and it does so not only to quantify “non-use” values, but also “use values,” in 
particular mortality risk, health effects, visibility, and water quality.
38   Agencies also perform cost-
                                                 
33 This work is summarized in FREY & STUTZER, supra note 28. 
34 State governments do use CV studies.  See John B. Loomis, Contingent Valuation Methodology and the US 
Institutional Framework, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 14, at 618-20.  Oregon relied on 
QALYs in a notorious episode 15 years ago, but it appears that state governments do not use QALYs much.  See 
Adler, supra note 22, at 3-4.  As far as I’m aware, happiness surveys have not been yet employed by either state or 
federal governments.  
35 “To date, techniques for the monetary valuation of environmental damage and benefits [in particular CVs] have been 
more extensively developed and applied in the United States than in Europe.” Francois Bonnieux & Pierre Rainelli, 
Contingent Valuation Methodology and the EU Institutional Framework, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, 
supra note 14, at 593.  By contrast, QALYs have a less central role in health policymaking in the U.S. government as 
compared to certain foreign governments.  See Adler, supra note 22, at 4.  
36 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).  On the 
methodology of cost-benefit analysis and its use by the federal government, see generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & 
ERIC. A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2006); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. 
Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 269 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); Matthew D. 
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999). 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 227-248. 
38 The following are regulatory impact analyses (obtained from the AEI-Brookings Joint Center database, see 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications), or Federal Register notices accompanying rulemakings, in which EPA has 
explicitly relied upon CV studies to quantify use values.   Because the Joint Center database is incomplete, and because 
the RIAs and Federal Register notices are not always explicit about whether CV or revealed preference techniques  
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benefit analysis outside the rulemaking context, and CV surveys have been used here, particularly 
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (in evaluating public works projects) and the Forest Service 
(in evaluating forest plans), as well as by the Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
and National Parks Service.
39 
 
  How, exactly, do CV studies percolate into these agencies’ cost-benefit analyses?  Who 
does the study?  How wide will the study’s scope be? The answer is “it depends.” Sometimes, an 
agency or its contractors will perform a CV study for a particular policy.  But this can be quite 
expensive, and it bears emphasis that there are alternative techniques that economize on decision 
costs.  For example, an agency might look to a study -- its own or some other agency’s --of a 
similar policy.  Or, the agency might break down the policy’s effects into different dimensions, and 
turn to the academic literature for CV studies regarding each dimension. A related idea: some CV 
studies inquire not just about an individual’s WTP/WTA amount for some policy but about the 
various individual characteristics and policy effects on the individual that presumably determine 
the WTP/WTA amount.  From these studies one might estimate a “benefits function,” correlating 
WTP/WTA with its determinants, and apply that function to the particular policy at hand.
40 
  
  It is not particularly surprising that CV surveys are employed by administrative agencies in 
performing cost-benefit analysis.  After all, cost-benefit analysis employs a monetary scale for 
evaluating policies.  The welfare impacts, positive and negative, of a potential policy are reduced 
to dollar figures; those dollar amounts are then aggregated to determine whether the policy has net 
                                                                                                                                                                 
were employed to estimate values, the list here is surely not comprehensive.  See Regulatory Impact Analysis for the 
Stationary Internal Combustion Engine (RICE) NESHAP, at 8-24 to -26 (February 2004) (mortality risk); Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Point 
Source Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 57872, 57913-14 (Sept. 12, 2002) (water quality, including use values); National 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants 
Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38888, 38945-46 (June 22, 2000) (mortality risk); Asbestos Worker Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. 
24806, 24817 (April 27, 2000) (mortality risk); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor 
Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, at VII-38, VII-46, VII-47, VII-57 (Feb. 10, 
2000) (mortality risk, chronic bronchitis, asthma, visibility); Industrial Laundries, at 10-29, 10-59 (Aug. 18, 1999) 
(recreational benefits, mortality risk); Regional Haze Rule, at 9-13, 9-30, 9-37 (Apr. 22, 1999) (visibility, mortality 
risk, upper respiratory symptoms); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection 
Byproducts, at 4-20 (Dec. 16, 1998) (bladder cancer based on CV study of chronic bronchitis); Proposed Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Industry, at 7-8 (Sept. 21, 1998) 
(mortality risk); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System -- Proposed Regulations for Revision of the Water 
Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 63 Fed. Reg. 1536, 1602 (Jan. 9, 1998) (water quality, 
including recreational values); Activities in Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities, at 6-35 to -39 (Aug. 29, 
1996) (mortality risk); Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance 
Standards: Metal Products and Machinery, 60 Fed. Reg. 28210, 28261 (May 30, 1995) (mortality risk);  Municipal 
Solid Waste Landfills: NSPS, at 12-10 (April, 1994) (odors); Sacramento Nonattainment Area, South Coast 
Nonattainment Area, and Ventura County, at VII-11 (Feb. 15, 1994) (visibility); Pesticides and Ground Water 
Strategy: A Survey of Potential Impacts, at 26 (Feb. 22, 1991) (groundwater contamination); Listing of Surface Coal 
Mines for New Source Review, at VI-16 (Sept. 1985) (visibility).  
39 See Loomis, supra note 34, at 613-18. 
40 The alternative techniques described in this paragraph are all forms of “benefits transfer,” generally discussed in 
FREEMAN, supra note 14, at 453-56; Stale Navrud, Value Transfer and Environmental Policy, in INTERNATIONAL 
YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 2004/2005: A SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES 189 (Tom 
Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds.); and Randall S. Rosenberger & John B. Loomis, Benefit Transfer, in CHAMP ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 445.   
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costs or benefits relative to the status quo.  The CV technique, too, uses a dollar scale.  So the 
technique fits hand-in-glove with cost-benefit analysis. 
 
  But welfare polling formats that employ a nonmonetary scale can also feed into cost-benefit 
analysis: the valuations they yield can be translated into dollars via a conversion factor.  This, in 
fact, has been the chief way that QALYs have figured in agency decisionmaking in the United 
States.  Over the last decade, in several dozen cost-benefit analyses accompanying major 
rulemakings, the FDA has valued deaths or morbidity through QALY-to-dollar conversions.  Loss 
of health or loss of life is measured in QALYs.  The FDA then translates that QALY number into a 
dollar figure, to be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis, using a conversion factor such as 
$100,000 or $300,000 per QALY.
41  
 
  Why would the FDA be justified in employing QALY-to-dollar conversions, rather than 
ordinary WTP/WTA amounts elicited in CV studies or inferred from market or behavioral 
evidence, in undertaking cost-benefit analysis?  I have addressed this question at length 
elsewhere.
42 The answer, very briefly, is twofold.  First, certain cognitive distortions that interfere 
with CV studies can be circumvented by QALY surveys.
43  Second, even if elicited without 
distortion, WTP/WTA amounts will not be perfect proxies for welfare.  For example, wealthier 
individuals will tend to have higher WTP/WTA amounts for a given health impact or risk of death, 
not because that disease or risk has a greater effect on their well-being, but because money is less 
useful for them.   Money’s “marginal utility” is deflated by their wealth.  By contrast, QALYs are 
invariant to wealth.  While Donald Trump’s WTP to avoid a year of emphysema is likely to be 
vastly greater than my own, the QALY value of Donald’s emphysema and mine are exactly the 
same. 
 
Thus, under certain conditions, QALY-based money valuations of health or risk can be 
more accurate welfarist measures than WTP/WTA amounts.  Cost-benefit analysis incorporating 
these non-traditional money measures may be less likely to go astray – to pick policies that actually 
reduce overall welfare – than cost-benefit analysis incorporating the traditional, WTP/WTA 
measures. 
 
  Potential Use: Happiness-Based Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
  Happiness surveys, still confined to the academy in United States, have various potential 
roles in governmental decisionmaking.  One such role parallels FDA’s practice with respect to 
QALYs.  Just as the FDA currently incorporates QALYs into cost-benefit analysis via QALY-to-
dollar conversions, so welfare impacts valued on a happiness scale could be translated into money 
with a conversion factor and then fed into cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Some academic work in this vein has been undertaken.  For example, economists Bernard 
van Praag and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell derived money valuations of the noise impact of the 
                                                 
41 See Adler, supra note 22, at 57-60. 
42 See id. at 24-42. 
43 On this point, see also infra text accompanying notes 151-152.  
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Amsterdam airport from happiness surveys.
44  They surveyed a random sample of individuals 
living near the airport, inquiring both about their happiness and about other characteristics, 
including noise exposure and income.  An equation explaining happiness values (the dependent 
variable) as a function of these characteristics (the independent variables) was then estimated.  
Happiness was negatively correlated with noise, and positively correlated with income.   
 
The ratio of the coefficients established a noise-to-dollar tradeoff ratio R.  That ratio can be 
used to monetize the noise-reduction benefits of a policy to deal with airport noise.   If a policy 
reduces the amount of noise by N noise units, the money equivalent is RN.   Since R is itself the 
product of the noise-to-happiness tradeoff rate H and the happiness-to-dollar tradeoff rate D
45, the 
van Praag/Ferrer-i-Carbonell technique is equivalent to translating the noise-reduction effects of a 
policy into happiness units, and then converting those happiness amounts units into dollars.  This 
approach for monetizing welfare impacts – let’s call it “happiness-to-dollar conversions” -- is 
directly analogous to the FDA’s technique of valuing health effects on a QALY scale and then 
converting the QALY amounts into dollars 
 
 Andrew Clark and Andrew Oswald have generalized the van Praag/Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
approach.  With data from the British Household Panel Survey, they estimate a happiness function 
that depends both on income and other characteristics, and use that function to calculate happiness-
to-dollar conversion amounts for changes in employment, health, and martial status.  And they 
point out that the method, in principle, is applicable to any life change – the relevant characteristics 
need simply to be documented, along with happiness levels and income, in a happiness survey.
46   
 
The rationale for using happiness-to-dollar conversions, in lieu of or in addition to 
traditional WTP/WTA amounts,
47 as an input to cost-benefit analysis is parallel to the QALY case.  
Consider the example of noise.  Being exposed to noise is not a health impact, and is not picked up 
by current QALY surveys; thus, the QALY-to-dollar technique is unavailable.   The variation in 
housing prices as between noisier and quieter neighborhoods might be used to estimate WTP/WTA 
for noise, but this “revealed preference” technique will be accurate only if relocation costs are 
low.
48  CV studies are of course available, but individuals may have some difficulty determining 
their WTP/WTA to avoid noise, and wealth effects may skew these valuations.  Even if cognitive 
                                                 
44 See BERNARD VAN PRAAG & ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, HAPPINESS QUANTIFIED: A SATISFACTION CALCULUS 
APPROACH 219-38 (2004). 
45 D=dollars/happiness.  H=happiness/noise.   R=dollars/noise=H×D.  RN=(HN)×D. 
46 See Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, A Simple Statistical Method for Measuring how Life Events Affect 
Happiness, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1139 (2002).   Similarly, in a recent paper Frey and Stutzer use happiness data 
to monetize the effect of terrorism.  See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness Research: State and Prospects, 62  
REV. SOC. ECON. 207, 220-23 (2005). 
47 Happiness-to-dollar conversions based on happiness surveys that focus on the respondents’ positive and negative 
affects are clearly distinct from valuations derived from CV surveys, since CV surveys inquire about an individual’s 
WTP/WTA for a policy given the totality of its effects on the individual’s well-being, while these sorts of happiness-
to-dollar conversions yield the amount of money sufficient to produce an affective impact on the individual 
counterbalancing the affective impact of the policy.  Happiness-to-dollar conversions based on life-satisfaction 
questions are closer to CV valuations, although even here the valuations may be different given, for example, different 
biases that may affect the two formats.  See infra text accompanying note 54 (discussing affective versus life-
satisfaction conceptions of happiness surveys). 
48 See VAN PRAAG & FERRER-I-CARBONELL, supra note 44, at 220-24.  
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distortions and wealth effects aren’t expected to be large, happiness-to-dollar conversions furnish 
useful, additional information for the cost-benefit analyst. 
 
Potential Use: Alternative Policy Analysis 
 
  Cost-benefit analysis is the dominant technique for policy analysis in the United States.  By 
“policy analysis,” I mean some technique for evaluating governmental choices: the choice of 
issuing one or another regulation, the choice of undertaking some project or doing nothing.  But 
cost-benefit analysis is not, and should not be, the sole policy-analytic technique.  Alternative 
methods may be legally required, or morally preferable, and the non-monetary valuations furnished 
by certain welfare polling formats (such as QALYs or happiness surveys) can provide numerical 
inputs into these alternative methods. 
 
  Health and safety regulation provides an obvious example.   Some important statutory 
provisions, such as the provision governing noncarcinogenic pollutants in the Clean Air Act, the 
food licensing provision in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the toxins provision in the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, preclude cost-benefit analysis.  Instead, these provisions 
instruct the agency to protect the public health and safety, perhaps with some gross cutoff (for 
example, maximize public health and safety up to the point that is technologically feasible, or up to 
the point that firms begin to go bankrupt).
49  Fatalities furnish a crude index of public health and 
safety.  Air pollutants, workplace toxins, and dangerous foods or additives can cause all manner of 
nonfatal diseases.  QALYs, which subsume both death and other health impacts, provide a better 
index of public health and safety than total fatalities, the level of fatality risk, or total population 
longevity without health adjustments.  QALY-maximization (perhaps with a cost or feasibility 
cutoff) is therefore the most attractive way to interpret health-and safety-focused statutes such as 
those just mentioned.
50   This point – it should be stressed – applies not merely to the agencies that 
have traditionally interested public health researchers, including FDA, but to any agency 




                                                 
49 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1293, 1414-17 (2003); ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ___. 
50 QALY-maximization should be seen as a sophisticated variant of “risk-risk” analysis: one that takes account of 
health quality as well as loss of life.  On “risk-risk” analysis, see, e.g., RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING 
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).  To be sure, the language of 
the safety-focused statute might prohibit a risk-risk approach, requiring the agency instead to focus on the reduction of 
certain kinds of risks.  See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (interpreting Section 
109 of the Clean Air Act to preclude a risk-risk approach).  But even in this sort of case QALYs can be useful, in 
quantifying the degree to which the relevant kind of risk has been reduced.     And in any event a strong case can be 
made that health and safety statutes should be read to permit risk-risk analysis absent a clear Congressional statement 
to the contrary. 
  As noted in the text, an agency might couple QALY-maximization with a feasibility or cost cutoff.  The latter 
sort of procedure – maximizing QALYs within a cost budget – is a kind of “cost-effectiveness analysis,” often 
proposed by public health scholars.  See Adler, supra note 22, at 8-10. 
51 See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.2d 1027, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir., 1999) (suggesting that EPA cure 
constitutional difficulties in the Clean Air Act by measuring the benefits of air pollution regulations using QALYs), 
rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Rafael Ponce et al., Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and Dose-Response 
Models in Environmental Health Policy Analysis: Methodological Considerations, 274 SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL 
ENVIRONMENT 79 (2001) (discussing use of QALYs for risk assessment with heterogeneous health impacts).  
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  A different reason for departing from cost-benefit analysis is moral rather than legal. Eric 
Posner and I have argued at length, in various publications, that cost-benefit analysis is morally 
defensible as a decision procedure implementing overall well-being.
52  But the sum of WTP/WTA 
amounts becomes an increasingly imperfect proxy for overall well-being as wealth effects and the 
variable marginal utility of money become pronounced.
53  Consider an extreme example: tax-and-
transfer policy.  A tax scheme that would raise $100 million dollars from the middle- and upper 
classes and transfer that money to the poor, with $10 million in administrative costs, will be 
viewed by traditional cost-benefit analysis as an inadvisable project, with $10 million in costs.  
Total WTP of the impoverished persons who would benefit from the scheme is $100 million, and 
total WTA of the taxpayers who would fund the scheme is also $100 million, so the transfer itself 
is seen as a wash.  But of course, if the marginal utility of money decreases with income, the 
transfer may increase overall welfare. 
 
  One way to reduce the inaccuracy of cost-benefit analysis in tracking overall welfare is to 
adjust WTP/WTA amounts using so-called distributive weights. (These would deflate WTP/WTA 
amounts as the affected individuals become wealthier.)  Another technique, discussed in the 
previous Section, is to evaluate a policy by monetizing certain of its welfare effects through 
QALY-to-dollar or happiness-to-dollar conversions, adding them to the WTP/WTA numbers 
valuing the policy’s remaining effects.   A third possibility is to circumvent dollars entirely and 
measure all of the policy’s effects as negative or positive amounts on some nonmonetary scale.  
Which of these three techniques is best for maximizing overall welfare is a complicated matter, 
which I cannot consider in detail here.  But it seems at least plausible that policy evaluation with a 
nonmonetary scale should be considered as an alternative or supplement to cost-benefit analysis, 
not merely in contexts where cost-benefit analysis is legally precluded, but even in contexts where 
it is not – where statutes permit or require agencies to maximize overall welfare. 
 
  What would the nonmonetary scale be?  It could be a QALY scale – but since there are 
many aspects of well-being that are distinct from physical or mental health, QALY maximization 
is more easily justified as implementing a statutory mandate to focus on health and safety than as a 
proxy for overall welfare.  Happiness maximization is probably a better proxy for overall welfare, 
(although not a perfect one).
54  A number of scholars have proposed that government evaluate 
policies by determining which one maximizes happiness.  For example, Bruno Frey and Alois 
Stutzer write: 
 
                                                 
52 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36; Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36; 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36. 
53 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ___; Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 
36, at 286-87, 300-05; Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 224. 
54 The standard view, in the happiness-survey literature, is that the psychological item being measured “consists of 
three interrelated components: life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect. Affect refers to pleasant and 
unpleasant moods and emotions, whereas life satisfaction refers to a cognitive sense of satisfaction with life.” Ed 
Diener & Eunkook Suh, Measuring Quality of Life: Economic, Social, and Subjective Indicators, 40 SOCIAL 
INDICATORS RESEARCH 189, 200 (1997).  Maximizing positive and negative affect is not the same as maximizing 
overall well-being, because well-being isn’t just a matter of mental states.  See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, 
supra note 36, at ch. 2.   Maximizing the extent to which individuals are satisfied with their lives is the same as 
maximizing well-being only if individuals are accurate in perceiving and valuing their achievements with respect to 
well-being.  
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The use of measures of happiness allows for a new way of evaluating the effects of government expenditure. . 
. . The problem has been approached scientifically by using cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are the 
recipients’ marginal willingness to pay, which is best measured by a contingent valuation analysis.… This 
method is best suited to relatively small and isolated public projects, but it breaks down when it comes to 
more extensive expenditure policies.  Simulations using microeconomic happiness functions with a large 
number of determinants may be better able to evaluate the widespread effects of such policies.
55 
 
Thomas Griffith has suggested that happiness surveys be employed to help set tax policy.  Tax 
policy scholarship often begins with a utilitarian “social welfare function” which maximizes the 
sum of individual utilities, in turn calculated as the logarithm of individual income.
56  This function 
is mathematically tractable and has the property of being increasing in income at a decreasing rate, 
thus justifying progressive taxation, but is not based in any systematic research into how income 
translates into well-being.  Griffiths argues that the survey data on the correlation between income 
and happiness confirms the basic supposition of declining marginal income utility, but should be 
used to determine the specific shape of the social welfare function.
57   
 
  Admittedly, tax-and-transfer policy is more the domain of legislatures than administrative 
agencies.  Even so, happiness-based valuation of income redistribution could have some place in 
agency practice – for example, at agencies that provide foreign aid or that administer domestic 
welfare programs.  A different and more broadly applicable approach to happiness-based policy 
analysis builds on work by Ruut Veenhoven, a leading happiness scholar, who proposes that 
“happy life expectancy” be used as a metric for comparing different nations.  The “happy life 
expectancy” (HLE) of a given country is simply average longevity multiplied by average happiness 
levels expressed in surveys.
58  HLE policy analysis would be an analogue to QALY-maximization. 
The aim in both cases is to maximize quality-adjusted longevity.  In the latter case, longevity is 
adjusted for health quality, using QALY surveys; in the former case, it would be adjusted for 
happiness, using happiness surveys.
59 
 
The Nobel prize-wining psychologist Daniel Kahneman suggests a policy-analytic 
technique which is broadly similar to HLE analysis.
60  Kahneman is skeptical of the standard 
happiness surveys.  He prefers a moment-based format that asks people to express the quality of 
different momentary experiences on a numerical scale, rather than the standard format which elicits 
                                                 
55 FREY & STUTZER, supra note 28, at 176.  See also Life Satisfaction: The State of Knowledge and Implications for 
Government 35-36 (Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office, United Kingdom, Dec., 2002), available at http://www.e-
democracy.gov.uk/knowledgepool/default.htm?mode=1&pk_document=28 (suggesting that happiness surveys might 
be used for policy analysis) 
56 See Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1363, 1367-68 (2004). 
57 See id. at 1397-98.  For other suggestions that happiness surveys be used to set tax policy or (relatedly) to measure 
poverty or inequality, see FREY & STUTZER, supra note 28, at 176-77; VAN PRAAG & FERRER-I-CARBONELL, supra 
note 44, at 239-317.  
58 Ruut Veenhoven, Happy Life-Expectancy: A Comprehensive Measure of Quality-of-Life in Nations, 39 SOCIAL 
INDICATORS RESEARCH 1, 29-31 (1996).  
59 Veenhoven himself does not propose that the HLE measure be used to evaluate policies.  See id. at 45.  But HLE 
maximization would seem to be at least as plausible as QALY maximization, which certainly has been proposed by 
many.  
60 See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES 673, 689-92 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)  
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individual statements of overall happiness or life-satisfaction.
 61  Still, the basic idea is the same as 
HLE analysis, namely happiness maximization.  Kahneman’s approach predicts how policies will 
change individual experiences; translates those changes into a happiness scale via survey data (in 
Kahneman’s case, momentary data); and picks the policy with the biggest net happiness benefit. 
 
Actual Use: Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
 
  To this point, I have discussed the actual or potential use of welfare polling data in policy 
analysis:  either cost-benefit analysis or some alternative policy-analytic technique.  But welfare 
polls have additional uses.  Imagine that a wrongdoer injures some person or resource.  How much 
should the wrongdoer pay in compensation?  CV surveys can help answer the question.  
  
  The “Superfund” statute (CERCLA),
62 the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),
63 and the Clean Water 
Act (CWA)
64 create a federal liability regime for oil spills and other releases of hazardous 
substances that harm publicly owned natural resources.
65  The statutes define natural resources 
broadly as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, groundwater, drinking water supplies, and other 
such resources.”
66   State or federal governments are authorized to assess damages for such harms 
and to sue polluters for recovery of these damages. Regulations issued by the Department of the 
Interior (DOI) guide assessments under CERCLA and CWA,
67 and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulates assessments under OPA.
68 
  
  An early version of the DOI regulations contemplated the use of CV studies.  This aspect of 
the regulations was challenged by industry but upheld by the D.C. Circuit in an important 1989 
decision that solidified the role of CVs for damage assessment.
69  CVs were given a further boost 
in 1993 when a high profile advisory panel convened by NOAA, including Kenneth Arrow and 
other eminent economists, endorsed their use if conducted in accordance with the panel’s 
guidelines.
70  Current DOI regulations explicitly permit the use of CVs in Type B (those not using 
a standard computer model) assessments.
71  While NOAA regulations do not explicitly authorize 
the use of CVs, an appendix lists CVs as a potential tool.
72  
  
                                                 
61 See id.; Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 28, at 3; Daniel Kahneman et al., Back 
to Bentham: Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 375 (1997). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2000). 
63 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2000). 
64 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000) (creating liability for discharges into navigable waters). 
65 See Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees:  Whose Side Are They Really on?, 5 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYER 407, 413-18 (1999), for a description of the relationship between the three statutes.   
66 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16);  33 U.S.C. § 2701(20).  The statutes and implementing regulations are summarized in Charles 
B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration, 72 TULANE L. REV. 417 (1997); and Dale B. 
Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57 (2002). 
67 43 C.F.R. Part 11 (2005). 
68 15 C.F.R. Part 990 (2005). 
69 See State of Ohio v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989).    
70 See Kenneth Arrow et al., Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation (Jan. 11, 1993). 
71 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (c)(2)(vii) (2000). 
72 See 61 Fed. Reg. 498-99 (Jan. 5, 1996).  The D.C. Circuit has upheld the use of CVs in OPA assessments.  See 
General Electric v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 773-74 (1997).  
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CV surveys were in fact employed in the damage assessment for the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil 
spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska  -- where the multi-billion dollar damage estimates  
generated by the studies helped induce Exxon’s large settlement.
73  CVs have also been used in a 




  Potential Use: Damages, Fines, Prices, Taxes 
 
  Using CVs in natural resource damage assessments is only the tip of the iceberg.  
Whenever monetary damages are meant to be compensation for a welfare loss, CVs have a 
potential role.  They can be used on a one-off basis to make natural resource damage assessments, 
as has in fact occurred under the federal regime just described.  Alternatively, they might be used 
to generate a schedule of natural resource damages.  The federal regime includes a schedule for 




“Damages,” of course, need not be limited to natural resources.  They might be damages to 
persons too.  Of course, given tort law’s solicitude for case-by-case decisionmaking, the notion of 
using CVs or other welfare polls to establish a damages schedule for death, physical injury, pain 
and suffering, and other nonpecuniary losses seems quite unrealistic.
76  More feasible is expert 
testimony at the damages phase that is grounded in CV surveys.
77  These surveys might also 
inform workers compensation schedules, which to a limited extent cover not merely lost wages and 
out-of-pocket medical costs (where welfare polls wouldn’t be useful), but also pain and suffering.
78 
 
  To be sure, tort law and workers compensation is the province of the states.  On the other 
hand, setting fines or fees for behavior that threatens life, health, natural resources, or other 
determinants of well-being falls within the jurisdiction of various federal agencies.  And there is a 
strong economic justification for doing so where these welfare impacts are “externalities” of the 
behavior: where the transaction costs of negotiations between actor and cost-bearers are high. 
“Fines” have the flavor of a sanction that is clearly established prior to the welfare-affecting 
behavior; “fees” (or taxes) have the flavor of a price that is clearly established ex ante; “damages” 
                                                 
73 See Loomis, supra note 34, at 622; Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages 
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENVT’L AND RESOURCE ECON. 257, 278 (2003).   
74 See Loomis, supra note 34, at 620-22; Navrud & Pruckner, supra note 17, at 11-13.  Cf. Thompson, supra note 66, 
at 70-87 (noting that CV studies have been prepared in a number of natural resource damages case, often leading to 
settlement, but that in the very few adjudicated cases, courts have rejected CV evidence).  
Although it appears CVs are most frequently used in this area to estimate damage to non-use values, 
estimating non-use values has not been their exclusive use and certainly need not be.  See Loomis, supra note 34, at 
621.  The DOI regulations, in fact, prefer CVs for use values as opposed to non-use values.  See 43 C.F.R. § 
11.83(c)(2)(vii) (2005).  The NOAA appendix, which suggests CVs as a possible method of analysis, mentions their 
use for both direct and passive use values.  See 61 Fed. Reg. at 499 .   
75 See Anderson, supra note 66, at 457-63; Murray B. Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of 
Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 51, 76-80 (1998). Indeed, CVs were, at least at one 
point, used as inputs to the federal schedule.  See Rutherford, supra, at 78; Loomis, supra note 34, at 620. 
76 See Rutherford et al., supra note 75, at 75-76 (discussing personal injury scheduling abroad and proposals to do so in 
the U.S.) 
77 See, e.g., Brendan I. Koerner, What’s Your Happiness Worth?, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2004) (describing an 
economist who testifies as an expert in tort cases regarding the size of hedonic damages, using a WTP measure). 
78 See Rutherford et al., supra note 75, at 72-73.  
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have the flavor of a sanction that is established ex post.  But these are pretty thin distinctions.  The 
basic idea is that regulators have good reason for measuring the welfare effects of certain private 
behaviors on a money scale, and making the actors pay those amounts (either to the state, or to the 
harmed parties); CV studies, in turn, can be used to help determine what the amounts should be.  In 
one illustrative study, Mauzerall, Kim, Sultan, and Bradford show how to calculate fees for 
nitrogen oxides emissions from power plants. They correlate the location of the plant with 
predicted morbidity and mortality effects per unit of pollution (depending on meterorological 
conditions and demographics at that location), and then attach a price to predicted deaths and 




 Environmental  trading  markets (ETMs) present a similar potential application for CV 
studies.  The basic idea of such markets, as in “cap-and-trade” pollution regimes or wetlands 
banks, is that actors are allotted limits to the amount of environmental damage they can produce, 
and can comply with these limits either by reducing their own harmful behavior or by purchasing 
credits from other actors.
80  A crucial issue for any ETM is the “currency” for the market.  Are 
actors allotted limits, and assigned credits for reductions in environmental harm, that are expressed 
in physical units (tons of pollutant, acres of wetland)?  In nonmonetary units of environmental 
harm (fatalities caused, acres of wetland adjusted for environmental quality in some sense)?  Or 
perhaps in monetary units?  The last practice, not currently employed very much in ETMs, might 
seem unrealistic given the costs of CV studies.
81  But this objection overlooks the possibility of an 
ETM function or schedule that converts physical impacts into dollars, depending on characteristics 
of the environmental resources, the affected population, and so on.  Concretely: rather than telling 
a polluting firm that it cannot emit more than X tons of nitrogen oxides and giving it a tradeable 
credit for every ton its emissions are below the limit, the polluter might instead be told not to emit 
more than $Y dollar-equivalents of nitrogen oxides, and given a tradeable $1 credit for every 
dollar-equivalent its emissions are below the allotment.  This approach, by contrast with the use of 
physical units (the main approach in practice), has the virtue of recognizing that polluting activities 
with identical physical impacts can have quite heterogeneous welfare effects. 
 
  A final important note: CVs would seem to be the natural welfare-polling format for setting 
damages, fines and fees, which after all are dollar amounts.  But QALY-to-dollar and happiness-to-
dollar conversions could in principle be used here, as in cost-benefit analysis – and with similar 
justification.   Heinz Welsch has in fact used happiness surveys to quantify the monetary cost of 




  Actual Use: Environmental Impact Statements and Rulemaking Notices 
 
                                                 
79 Denise Mauzerall et al., Charging NOx Emitters for Health Damages: An Exploratory Analysis (CESifo Working 
Paper No. 1442, April 2005), available at http://SSRN.com/abstract=706782 
80 See James Sulzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 
616-22 (2000). 
81 See id. at 634. 
82 See Heinz Welsch, Preferences over Prosperity and Pollution: Environmental Valuation Based on Happiness 
Surveys, 55 KYLKOS 473 (2002). Note also that QALYs or happiness units could, in principle, be used as the ETM 
currency rather than dollars.  
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  The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), enacted in 1970, requires federal agencies 
to prepare an environmental impact statement to accompany all “proposals [for] major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”
83  This brief language has 
made environmental scoping a pervasive aspect of federal agency decisionmaking – as evidenced 
by the large body of federal case law about the impact-statement requirement
84 and by the sheer 
number of impact statements and preparatory documents.   It is estimated that roughly 500 impact 
statements and 50,000 “environmental assessments” – preliminary documents which consider 




It is now clear that purely human impacts do not trigger NEPA.  An action must have a 
effect on the physical environment – on “the air, land, [or] water”
86 -- to come within the scope of 
the statute.
87  But, once triggered, the statute requires an impact statement that describes the health, 
economic, and social effects of the agency action that are proximately caused by its physical 
impact – not merely the physical impact itself.
88  The bottom line is that the kinds of effects 
described by the NEPA statements are multifold, including: health and mortality, land 
transformation, changes in land use, changes to water or air quality, effects on basic services 
(schools, police, fire), ecological impacts, noise and vibration, effects on transportation systems, 
aesthetics, recreation, and even housing quality or employment.
89  CV surveys are an obvious 
technique for quantifying these sorts of effects, and indeed agencies have used CVs to prepare 
environmental impact statements under NEPA.
90   
 
  NEPA is the quintessential example of a “communication forcing” statute.  It doesn’t give 
substantive priority to environmental considerations, but simply requires agencies to publicly 
communicate environmental effects – which might be useful insofar as it forces the agency to give 
those effects the weight required by existing statutes, or mobilizes political action by interested 
groups to amend the statutes.  A yet broader “communication forcing” statute is §553(c) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, generally obliging an agency to provide a public “statement of basis 
and purpose” – typically in the Federal Register -- when it enacts legally binding rules.
91   Where 
                                                 
83 42 U.S.C. §4332 (2000). 
84 See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (Release 3, 2005) (reviewing NEPA case law). 
85 See Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA Deskbook 9 (3d ed. 2003). 
86 Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F. 3d 1495, 1505 (9
th Cir. 1995). 
87 See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772-73 (1983); 40 C.F.R. §1508.14 
(2005).  
88 See Balitmore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 106-07 (1983). 
89 See, e.g., CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PROJECT 
AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 175-81 (2000); R.K. JAIN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 239-79 (2002). 
90 See Loomis, supra note 34, at 614-16; email from Charles Eccleston to Matthew D. Adler, 12/22/05.  See also L. 
Venkatachalam, supra note 14, at 89 (claiming that “the CV method is a widely used nonmarket valuation method 
especially in the areas of [inter alia] environmental impact assessment”); DAVID JAMES, THE APPLICATION OF 
ECONOMIC TECHNIQUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (1994) (discussing potential use of CVs in 
environmental impact assessment); RICHARD K. MORGAN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A 
METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 230-32 (1998) (same). It is difficult to quantify how frequently CVs are used under 
NEPA, because there is no searchable database of impact statements.  
91 5 U.S.C. §553(c) (2000). Rules of “agency organization, procedure, or practice” are exempted from the notice-and-
comment requirement, as are the categories of legislative rules described in 5 U.S.C. §553(a) – although in the case of 
rules relating to “public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts,” agencies often voluntarily choose to follow the 
§553(c) procedures.  
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welfare polls figure in internal agency deliberations preceding the enactment of a rule, the §553(c) 
statement accompanying the proposal may well discuss the polls.    
 
The most important example involves cost-benefit analysis – because, to date, the leading 
function of welfare polls has been to inform cost-benefit analysis.  The FDA’s Federal Register 
statements frequently use QALYs to describe the health effects of rules – since the FDA frequently 
incorporates QALY-to-dollar conversions in its cost-benefit analyses.
92  Other agencies, relying on 
CVs in their analytic documents, will then publish these in the Federal Register.  The 
communicative role of welfare polls, here, flows from their function in policy analysis, but is 
conceptually distinct.  It’s easy enough to imagine a nonpublic process of policy analysis, as 
indeed can occur for decisions that aren’t §553(c) rules or covered by NEPA or some other 
communication-forcing mandate. 
 
  Potential Use: Other Governmental Communications  
  
  Governmental communications to the public are multifold, including but hardly limited to 
communications that describe proposed policies.  Consider communications about governmental 
agendas, structures, or laws, or communications about the world (the state of the polity, say).   
GNP reports are an obvious example of the latter.   Because welfare is morally and legally relevant 
in many contexts, it will often be appropriate for governmental communications to include well-
being facts as part of the transmitted information – potentially bringing welfare polls into play.    
 
I will not attempt to discuss these potential communicative functions systematically.  But 
here are some exemplary proposals.  Kahneman and co-authors propose the creation of “national 
well-being accounts,” analogous to GNP.   Total well-being would be calculated based on the time 
spent by U.S. citizens in different activities, multiplied by the happiness measures for those 
activities, as derived using Kahneman’s experiential surveys.  
  
The goal of public policy is not to maximize measured GDP, so a better measure of well-being could help to 
inform policy. Here we propose measuring national-well-being by weighting the time allocated to various 
activities by the subjective experiences associated with those activities … 
 
  The [national well-being account] can be used to summarize the average affective well-being of a 
population. Three potential uses are the following: (i) Changes in well-being in a country over time can be 
tracked … (ii) For subpopulations (e.g., rich versus poor) at a given time, differences in well-being can be 
attributed to [differences in time allocation plus differences in affect from a given activity];  (iii) Differences 
in well-being between countries can likewise be compared and decomposed.
93 
  
The psychologist Ed Diener, one of the leading happiness scholars, has a parallel proposal for a 
“national index of subjective well-being,” which would incorporate data from more traditional 
happiness surveys. 
94   Finally, numerous scholars propose “environmental accounts” that would 
                                                 
92 See Adler, supra note 22, at 58 n.195 (citing Federal Register statements where FDA has used QALY-to-dollar 
conversions). 
93 Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AMER. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 
429, 433 (2004). 
94 Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index, 55 AMER. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 34 (2000).  
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track the state of the environment, and some have suggested that CVs could be used in preparing 
these.




III. DO WELFARE POLLS PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION ABOUT WELFARE? 
 
  The preceding part described a range of contexts in which governmental officials currently 
do, or potentially might, rely on valuations derived from welfare polls.  Whether officials ought to 
do so, of course, depends on the informational content of these polls.  Do they indeed provide 
substantial evidence about human well-being?    
 
  Think of the worry this way.  As Eric Posner and I have argued at length elsewhere, well-
being consists in the satisfaction of preferences that are self-interested (this rules out moral and 
other disinterested preferences) and that survive some degree of idealization.
96  Combining these 
conditions on preferences with conditions for surveys to evidence the preferences that respondents 
actually have, one might worry (1) that the preferences driving the survey are disinterested.  One 
might also worry that, even if they are self-interested, the preferences are non-ideal in the sense of 
being (2) poorly informed,
97 (3) distorted by cognitive bias, or (4) not the result of sufficient 
mental effort.  Further, respondent’s preferences might be self-interested and sufficiently idealized, 
but there may be slippage between the preferences and the answer provided in the survey, either 
because (5) the respondent is behaving strategically and not answering the question truthfully, or 
(6) is answering a different question from the one literally asked by the survey.  Finally, it might be 
objected that, even if each and every respondent in the survey has truthfully revealed her self-
interested and sufficiently idealized preferences, the sample of respondents is (7) not representative 
of the population that will be affected by the policy which the survey’s numbers will inform.   
 
  There is in fact a large scholarly literature concerning the validity of CV, QALY, and 
happiness surveys, and most of the specific objections raised in this literature fall under one of the 
seven headings just stated.  This Part surveys the difficulties.  I conclude that none disables the 
enterprise of welfare polling, but that many point to ways in which simplistic polling formats 
should be improved. 
 
  Moral and Other Disinterested Preferences 
 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., Navrud & Pruckner, supra note 17, at 15-16. 
96 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ___; Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 
36; Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 197-204; Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: 
A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 F.S.U.  L. REV. 241, 264-67 (2000). 
97 There is some dispute about whether “ideal” preferences are fully-informed preferences, objectively good 
preferences, or nonadapative preferences.  See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ___.  The first 
two approaches may well be quite close, see id., and since I find them more persuasive than the nonadaptive view of 
idealization, I will focus here on how to use welfare polls to provide relatively full information to respondents.  
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  Much of the scholarly criticism of CV surveys concerns moral preferences.
98 This is a 
particular worry when it comes to the valuation of the environment.   Environmental economists 
distinguish between “use values” and “nonuse values.”  A subject’s “use value” is her WTP/WTA 
for an impact on some part of the environment with which she physically interacts, for example a 
park that she visits or a lake in which she fishes.  Her “nonuse” value is her WTP/WTA for some 
environmental change that does not physically affect her – for example, degradation in some 
wilderness area that she never plans to visit, or the extinction of an endangered species that she has 
never seen.   
 
CVs for environmental nonuse values often display certain anomalies.  First, stated 
valuations are often extreme.  Respondents claim an infinite WTA for the disappearance of the 
good, or a zero WTP to preserve it, or refuse to answer the question entirely.  Second, nonextreme 
stated valuations are often insensitive to the scope or scale of the good.
99  For example, one well-
known study by Desvouges told three different groups of respondents that some number N of 
migrating birds die each year by drowning in uncovered waste-oil ponds, and inquired about WTP 
to save the birds by putting covers on the ponds.  The number N was varied among the groups: the 
first group was asked about WTP to save 2,000 birds, the second 20,000, the third 200,000.  Mean 
WTP values for the different surveys were virtually identical, despite the 10-fold differences in the 
size of the bird population saved: $80, $78, and $88.
100  Similarly, Kahneman and Knetsch found 
that Toronto residents were willing to pay only slightly more to clean up all the polluted lakes in 
Ontario than to clean up polluted lakes in one part of Ontario.
101  
 
Moral preferences plausibly explain, or help explain, both of these anomalies.
102  By “moral 
preference,” I mean some sort of choice-relevant attitude that is directly based in the respondent’s 
moral views, opinions, beliefs, and so on, rather than concern for her own interests.  Moral 
preferences may well be lexicographic: moral prohibitions on degrading the environment may be 
seen as absolute, or at least never overridable by benefit to the respondent. This explains infinite 
WTAs.  A perceived moral prohibition on degradation might translate into an objection to the very 
                                                 
98 For critical scholarship that points to the role of moral or otherwise “noneconomic” preferences in producing CV 
values, and the related problem of scope or embedding effects, see, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On 
Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra note 14, at 3; Peter A. 
Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 
(1994); Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences or Attitude Expression? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to 
Public Issues, 19 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (1999). This scholarship is surveyed in Carson et al., supra note 14, at 
177, 181-84. 
99 See Carson et al., supra note 14, at 181-84; Venkatchalam, supra note 14, at 95-102. 
100 See William H. Desvousges et al. , Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of 
Validity and Reliabiltiy, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra note 14, at 91, 100.  
101 See Kahneman et al., supra note 98, at 213 (discussing this study). 
102 See sources supra note 98; Jonathan Baron, Biases in the Quantitative Measurement of Values for Public Decisions, 
122 PSYCH. BULL. 72, 74-77, 82-84 (1997); Russell K. Blamey, Citizens, Consumers and Contingent Valuation: 
Clarification and the Expression of Citizen Values and Issue-Opinions, in FORESTRY, ECONOMICS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 103 (W.L. Adamowicz et al. eds., 1996); Brett R. Gelso & Jeffrey M. Peterson, The Influence of 
Ethical Attitudes on the Demand for Environmental Recreation: Incorporating Lexicographic Preferences, 53 ECOL. 
ECON. 35 (2005); Clive L. Spash & Nick Hanley, Preferences, Information and Biodiversity Protection, 12 ECOL. 
ECON. 191 (1995); Thomas H. Stevens et al., Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM Estimates 
Really Show?, 67 LAND ECON.  390 (1991); Arild Vatn, Environmental Valuation and Rationality, 80 LAND ECON. 1, 
11-13 (2004).   
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enterprise of contingent valuation and thus “protest votes”: refusals to answer, or zero WTPs, or 
(once again) infinite WTAs.   
 
Further, and a bit more subtly, scholars have identified a number of mechanisms by which 
moral preferences could produce scope-insensitivity.  Respondents might understand the CV 
survey as asking about their willingness to make a charitable contribution in the service of their 
moral preferences, which is limited by their perceived budget for charity.  They might get a “warm 
glow” from promoting those preferences, a kind of positive feeling occasioned by charitable acts, 
and state a valuation which is really their WTP/WTA for that warm glow, not for the object of the 
preferences.  Or the preferences might be weakly lexicographic, ordering any degree of 
degradation over any money loss to the subject, up to some threshold. 
 
  Critics are right to worry about the extreme-value and scope anomalies.  But it is hard to 
see how the role of moral preferences in fueling anomalous valuations in CV studies targeted at 
nonuse values would justify a general disavowal of CV surveys.  Rather, it justifies a narrowing of 
the surveys’ focus.  Respondents should be focused on their self-interested preferences; moral and 
other disinterested preferences should be screened out.   
 
My position, it should be stressed, is not that citizens’ moral and other disinterested 
preferences have no role to play in the political process.  That would be an absurd position.  The 
claim, rather, is that CV studies are not the appropriate mechanism for rendering governmental 
choice sensitive to such preferences. Other mechanisms (for example, deliberative polls) are better.  
CV surveys ask the respondent to express her WTP/WTA for policies, taking into consideration 
her existing wealth.  Because money is a “primary good” – generically useful for well-being – this 
is a plausible, if rough, way to capture the impact of the policies on her well-being.
103  By contrast, 
it is very hard to see why an individual’s WTP/WTA for a policy is the correct measure (even 
roughly) of the degree of influence that her moral preference for the policy should have.  Both the 
democratic procedure of “one person/one vote,” and deliberative procedures that (in effect) weight 
moral preferences in proportion to how persuasive and cogent they are, constitute procedures for 
incorporating citizen moral preferences into governmental choice that have a much stronger 
normative grounding than the CV procedure.  In any event, that is the position taken here – that 
citizens’ disinterested preferences surely ought to influence governmental choice, but not via CV 
studies, which are best defended as a mechanism for measuring welfare impacts.  CV studies 
should therefore be structured to screen out moral and other disinterested preferences. 
 
To be sure, there is a need for much research, theoretical and applied, on how to perform 
the screening.  First, there is some fuzziness, as a theoretical matter, about where the boundary 
between self-interest and disinterest lies.  For example, are “altruistic” preferences concerning 
friends or family members welfare-enhancing or disinterested?
104   But at a minimum it seems 
clear that purely moral preferences fall within the disinterested category.   
 
Second, how should surveys be structured to wash out moral preferences?  Should 
respondents simply be reminded to direct their attention to their own well-being?  Will 
                                                 
103 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ch. 3 (defending WTP/WTA as a rough proxy for 
interpersonally comparable well-being); Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 214-38. 
104 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ___.  
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exhortations to provide self-regarding valuations work to screen out moral preferences – or will 
they trigger a protest reaction by respondents?  The applied economists who work on CV design 
have done very little to answer this second set of questions
105 – because of the mistaken orthodoxy 




At a minimum, moral preferences can be screened out in a rough and ready way by limiting 
the survey population to those who (on our best current theory of well-being) have a welfare stake 
in the project or resource.   In the case of environmental goods – again, the area where CVs have 
bumped up against moral preferences most violently – the distinction between use and non-use 
works pretty well.
107  Those who do not physically interact with some environmental amenity 
should not be asked about WTP/WTA for it; those who do should be asked questions that are 
targeted at the interaction (e.g., how much are you WTP/WTA to visit the park, see the view, etc.), 
and not at the sheer existence of the amenity.  In point of fact, administrative agencies already 
implicitly do this outside the area of environmental law.
108  The Department of Agriculture doesn’t 
ask animal rights activists for their WTP/WTA to have slaughterhouses closed; the Postal Service 
doesn’t ask religious activists for their WTP/WTA not to have pornography shipped through the 
mail; the FDA doesn’t ask libertarians for their WTP/WTA not to have paternalistic regulations 
imposed on others. 
  
  The discussion to this point has focused on the CV instrument.  What about QALYs and 
happiness surveys?   QALY surveys can inquire about the respondent’s own actual or hypothetical 
health state (as in patient or general population surveys), or about someone else’s health state (as in 
surveys where physicians are asked to rate a patient’s health).
109   In principle, the same is true of 
                                                 
105 Economists have used second-order techniques to determine whether moral preferences are influencing valuations, 
for example “includ[ing] questions in the survey to probe respondents’ understanding and motivations.”  Boyle, supra 
note 14, at 145 (citing examples).  It is also fairly routine to ignore extreme valuations.  See, e.g., Kevin J. Boyle & 
John C. Bergstrom, Doubt, Doubts, and Doubters: The Genesis of a New Research Agenda? in VALUING 
ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 14, at 196-99.  But eliminating numerical outliers is not a full solution, 
since moral preferences can also produce nonextreme values, for example through a charitable contribution or “warm 
glow” effect. 
  There is a literature on the use of so-called “cheap talk scripts” to reduce “hypothetical bias” in CVs – the 
tendency of respondents to overstate what they actually would pay.  See, e.g., James T. Murphy & Thomas H. Stevens, 
Contigent Valuation, Hypothetical Bias, and Experimental Economics, 33 AGR. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 182, 186-87 
(2004).   Researchers have not conceptualized these scripts as a way to screen out moral preferences, but in fact some 
of them might (inter alia) do that.  See, e.g., James T. Murphy et al., An Empirical Study of Hypothetical Bias in 
Voluntary Contribution Contingent Valuation: Does Cheap Talk Matter?  (U. Mass., Working Paper No. 2003-2), at 1 
(describing “cheap talk script” that enjoined respondents not to articulate the fair price for a good). 
106 See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 33 
(1994). 
107 I say “pretty well,” not perfectly, because nonuse values subsume not merely existence values but also option values 
– self-interested preferences to preserve some environmental good that the respondent doesn’t currently use but might 
use in the future.  Nonuse values might also incorporate bequest values, but (as with existence values) these will 
presumably be substantially moralized, involving a sense of obligation to future generations. 
108 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at __; Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 
36, at 282; Diamond & Hausman, Is Some Number Better than No Number?, supra note 98, at 59.  
109 Another example of a QALY format that asks the respondent to value someone else’s health is the so-called “person 
tradeoff”  (PTO) format, which asks about tradeoffs between programs that benefit different numbers of persons in 
different health states; naturally invites the respondent to make a moral judgment; and is not much used in practice.   
See, e.g., Brazier, supra note __, at 26-27, 39-41.  Unlike CVs, PTOs may well be an appropriate way to elicit citizen  
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happiness states: someone might be asked to rate her own happiness or someone else’s.  It is easy 
to see how the latter sort of QALY and happiness surveys might elicit preferences that are not 
welfare-focused.  Health professional H, asked to evaluate patient P’s health state on a scale from 
0-1, might give a number that expresses (1) the contribution that the health state makes to P’s well-
being; (2) how healthy the state is, as a matter of pure “healthiness,” detached from well-being
110; 
or (3) how morally important it is to redress the state.   Similarly (although the point is harder to 
see), psychologist H asked to rate P’s happiness on a 1-7 scale might answer purely as a matter of 
psychological intensity (in some sense), rather than in terms of the contribution that the state makes 
to P’s quality of life.   
 
  By contrast, QALY and happiness surveys that ask the respondent to rate her own health 
state (actual or hypothetical) on a numerical scale  – like CV studies that ask about the subject’s 
WTP/WTA for her own health or psychological states, or about her use of environmental goods – 
would seem to naturally invite a self-interested perspective.  More research on the issue is certainly 
needed.  But it should be noted that the critics of QALYs and happiness studies have not identified 
extreme value or scope anomalies analogous to those that affect CV studies for non-use values.  
The possibility of moral preferences is not a theme in the critical literature, here.   This is some 
(admittedly preliminary) evidence that moral or otherwise disinterested preferences do not in fact 
substantially affect QALY and happiness studies that ask respondents about their own health or 
happiness states – the main variants currently in use. 
 
  Information 
 
  The prestigious NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation recommends:  “Adequate 
information must be provided to respondents about the environmental program that is offered. It 
must be defined in a way that is relevant to damage assessment.”
111  This bland advice conceals a 
host of complexities. 
 
  CV surveys do typically provide some information to the respondent, at least about certain 
attributes of the good at stake and the change in those attributes for which WTP/WTA is being 




Provision of information on the item being valued is the fundamental component of a contingent valuation 
survey.  Personal interviews have the highest ability because visual information is provided and an 
                                                                                                                                                                 
moral preferences.   That is not an issue I will pursue here – since survey instruments such as deliberative polls or 
perhaps PTOs that focus on moral preferences, and welfare polls, are complementary rather than being mutually 
exclusive.  See infra text accompanying notes 259-264.   The critical point for my purposes is that standard QALY 
survey formats, namely time-tradeoff and standard-gamble questions that ask about the respondent’s health, seem well 
suited to serve as welfare polls even if physician surveys or the PTO are not.  
110 See Adler, supra note 22, at 11-13. 
111 See Arrow et al., supra note 70, at 32-33. 
112 For discussions about the provision of information in CV surveys, see, e.g., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED 
PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, supra note 14, at 308-10, 331-2; Boyle, supra note 14, at 123-33; Boyle & Bergstrom, 
supra note 105, at 193-95; Alistair Munro & Nick D. Hanley, Information, Uncertainty, and Contingent Valuation, in 
VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 14, at 258; Venkatachalam, supra note 14, at 103-05.  On 
information-provision in preference surveys generally, see John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: 
Towards a Building Code, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 254-56 (1999).   
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interviewer is available to explain the information and answer questions. A mail survey is more limited 
because no interviewer is present to explain the visual information. Ability to provide information in a 
telephone survey is much more limited because no visual information is available.  Mixed mode surveys using 
a telephone interview after respondents have received written and visual information in the mail … is one way 
to overcome the informational deficiencies of telephone interviews.
113 
 
There is a literature that examines the effect of information on contingent valuation, which tends to 
find that information provision – or at least new information, not already known to the respondents 
– does shift WTP/WTA amounts.
114  
 
  Even in the face-to-face format, the information provided in CV surveys is nothing close to 
the “full information” that is normative for welfare.  Outcome O is better than outcome O* for 
person P only if P, under ideal conditions that include something like complete information, or at 
least the total amount of information that P can comprehend, prefers O to O*.   However these 
idealizing conditions are specified,
115 they presumably require a much richer description of the 
world than CV surveys actually provide.  
 
Why the shortfall?  To begin, there is a tradeoff between the amount of data provided and 
other desiderata such as respondent’s motivation and her success at processing the data.  P, packed 
to the gills with information, might be bored or overwhelmed.
116  
 
  The CV literature does not systematically discuss this important problem, namely how to 
optimize the amount of information given the cognitive and motivational costs of total 
information.
117   Part of the solution, presumably, is to use information-provision devices (such as 
helpful visual aids) that facilitate comprehension and processing.
118   
 
Surveys can also omit irrelevant information, which can interfere with the processing of 
relevant data.  In practice, at least implicitly, agencies often do this by using CVs that redescribe 
the goods at stake, focusing on the attributes that (the agency believes) are welfare relevant rather 
than attributes over which respondents have merely instrumental preferences – as means to some 
further end.  For example, health or safety agencies that perform cost-benefit analyses of policies 
to reduce ambient, food, or workplace toxins don’t employ CV studies that ask respondents about 
different concentrations of the toxins, or different mitigation technologies.  Rather, these studies 
ask about WTP/WTA for a change in fatality risk.   Similarly, an environmental agency doing a 
cost-benefit analysis of improved hunting and fishing opportunities would probably not describe at 
great length the variety of ecological changes producing larger game or fish stocks, but would ask 
                                                 
113 Boyle, supra note 14, at 121. 
114 See Munro & Hanley, supra note 112, at 259-60; Venkatachalam, supra note 14, at 103-05.  For a parallel finding 
about the effect of information on the policy judgments of respondents to deliberative polls, see Luskin et al., supra 
note 7. 
115 For a discussion, see THOMAS L. CARSON, VALUE AND THE GOOD LIFE 219-39 (2000). 
116 See, e.g., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, supra note 14, at 309; Payne et al., supra 
note 112, at 255. 
117 See generally Boyle and Bergstrom, supra note 105, at 195 (arguing for more research on information effects and 
fewer ad hoc practices). 
118 See Payne et al., supra note 112, at 255. Cf. Arrow et al., supra note 70, at 55 (stating that pictures and other visual 
aids can be helpful in providing information, but can also generate unwanted effects); Boyle, supra note 14, at 127 
(same).  
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about WTP/WTA for the relevant end-result of these changes, namely increased numbers of game 
or fish or increased catch rate.
119 
  
A yet more systematic version of this idea – that the informational base for surveys should 
include only welfare-relevant information – is exemplified by the so-called “conjoint analysis” 
variant of contingent valuation. In this format, various dimensions along which options can vary 
are defined, including both money costs to the respondents and other dimensions.  The respondent 
is then asked to choose among options described in terms of their locations on the dimensions.
120   
For example, recreational users of a lake might be asked to choose between the status quo and a 
clean-up measure characterized in terms of the tax burden; the size of the fish population; water 
clarity; and whether or not the water is potable.  
 
A very similar approach is often used in QALY valuation.   The problem of incomplete 
information is often discussed, here, with reference to the choice between patient and general 
population surveys.  Various non-informational considerations arguably weigh in favor of 
surveying the general population – for example, the fact that patients may be more prone to certain 
preference distortions, or likelier to behave strategically.
121  On the other hand, patients – by virtue 
of their direct experience of the health state – will be better informed about it.   
  
In assessing health states, a [general population] sample may be asked to consider a not-heretofore-
experienced health state as well as to perform the unfamiliar task of comparing and rating health states against 
one another.  The level of understanding of the nature of particular health states by members of the general 
public or by others who are not experiencing the health state is not always accurate …. Although efforts can 




The use of conjoint analysis in general-population QALY surveys is one response to this dilemma. 
Consider: a citizen asked to assign a health state to a 0-1 scale might be (1) simply told the name of 
the state (“pancreatitis,” “diabetes“); (2) given detailed information about the bodily changes that 
constitute the health state; (3) given some of that information, plus some information about the 
effect of the state on the subject’s life (how painful it is, how much mobility is restricted); or (4) be 
provided this welfare-relevant information in a systematic way.  Many QALY surveys take this last 
approach, using “health classification systems” to characterize health states – a direct analogue of 
the conjoint analysis approach to CVs.
123  For example, the Health Utilities Index, one of the most 
widely used health classification systems, characterizes health states as a combination of locations 
along eight dimensions – vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity, emotion, cognition, and 
pain.
124 
                                                 
119 See Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 283;  Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1009-10 (2004). 
120 On conjoint analysis in the CV context, see, e.g., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, 
supra note 14, at 248-95; Thomas P. Holmes & Wiktor L. Adamowicz, Attribute-Based Methods, in CHAMP ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 171. 
121 See, e.g., COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 99-100 (Marthe R. Gold et al. eds., 1996); Dolan, supra 
note 25, at 1739. 
122 COST-EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 121, at 100. 
123 See Brazier, supra note 26, at 57-81;Dolan, supra note 25, at 1731-32, 1744-45.  
124 See David H. Feeny et al., Health Utilities Index, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL 
TRIALS 239 (Bert Spilker ed., 1996).  
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Conjoint analysis is an important tool for QALY and CV surveys, but it should be stressed 
that the technique is no panacea.   First, bringing into play all the welfare relevant dimensions may 
be cognitively overwhelming for survey respondents.  Second, and more fundamentally, part of the 
function of welfare polling formats is to help determine what the dimensions of welfare are, not 
merely to quantify the tradeoffs among dimensions.  Conjoint analysis is no help in the former 
task.  This observation suggests that the practice of welfare polling, ideally, should have a 
bifurcated structure.   Many QALY or CV surveys surely should take for granted a set of  welfare 
dimensions, using conjoint analysis or less formal techniques to focus respondents on the relative 
contributions of those dimensions to well-being; but other surveys should be undertaken to identify 
the dimensions themselves.  Indeed, some survey work of this latter sort has occurred.
125 
  
  I have focused on the tradeoff between the epistemic costs and benefits of information 
provision.  Surveys, ideally, should evidence what people in an idealized informational, cognitive, 
and motivational state prefer; but providing more information may impair respondents’ cognition 
and motivation.   A different kind of cost to information provision is more prosaic.
126  Providing 
fuller information is expensive: in-person surveys, which do that best, are more expensive than 
mail or telephone surveys.  This problem – the resource cost of securing or transmitting 
information --  is of course a general one in policy analysis and is not limited to surveys.
127  Part of 
a solution, here, has been already discussed: rather than do a series of quick CV or QALY studies 
for particular decisions, agencies might perform a few very high-quality CV or QALY studies and 
incorporate their results in a multitude of decisions, for example via schedules.  The resource costs 
of information-provision can be spread over multiple decisions. 
 
  Information provision is not a concern of the standard happiness surveys.  The respondent 
is presumed to know about her own life, and is just asked to rate it.  One central thrust of the 
critical literature is to challenge this assumption. The subject may have forgotten facts about her 
own life (even her experiential states), or those facts may not be present to her mind.  
 
When asked, “Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days?” respondents are 
ideally assumed to review the myriad of relevant aspects of their lives and to integrate them into a mental 
representation of their life as a whole.  In reality, however, individuals rarely retrieve all information that may 
be relevant to a judgment.  Instead, they truncate the search process as soon as enough information has come 
to mind to form a judgment with sufficient subjective certainty.  Hence, the judgment is based on the 
information that is most accessible at that point in time.
128  
 
Kahneman’s competitor proposal to the standard happiness-survey methodology
129 is an attempt to 
survey individuals about aspects of their experiential life about which they can be assumed to be 
well (indeed, perfectly) informed – namely, what a current bit of experience feels like --- and to 
circumvent their fallible memories about past experiences.  This eases the informational demands 
of surveys, and may well be an improvement on the standard format.  
 
                                                 
125 See infra Part V (describing the WHOQOL survey). 
126 See Munro & Hanley, supra note 112, at 276-77. 
127 See, e.g., Maxine E. Dakins, The Value of the Value of Information, 5 HUM. & ECOL. RISK ASSESSMENT 281 (1999). 
128 Schwartz & Strack, supra note 28, at 63. 




  The idealized preferences that constitute well-being are rational preferences. They must 
satisfy certain structural conditions.  Those conditions plausibly include the axioms of expected 
utility theory.  To be sure, the correctness of that particular theory of rationality is open to debate.  
But however “preference distortions” are defined, it seems clear that respondents to welfare polls 
are often in their grip. 
 
  The CV literature identifies a number of major distortions. We have known since the 
seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman that ordinary individuals deviate from expected utility 
theory in processing probabilities,
130 so it is not surprising that survey respondents in particular do. 
Expected utility theory implies that WTP/WTA for small increments in risks should be roughly 
proportional to the size of the change; but many studies have found that stated WTP/WTA amounts 
tend to fall far short of proportionality, often changing very little in response to risk changes (a 
kind of scope effect).
131  Second, CV surveys regularly show large disparities between WTP and 
WTA, even where income effects are not in play (for example, in the well-known study where 
respondents endowed with a coffee mug had WTA values much higher than the WTP values of 
respondents not thus endowed). 
132 These disparities are, to a substantial extent, a product of “loss 
aversion”: individuals frame effects as losses or gains relative to some arbitrary reference point, 
weighting losses more heavily than gains.
133  Even if one rejects expected utility theory as the 
correct account of rational choice, a strong normative case can be made that loss aversion is a kind 
of preference distortion.   
 
Third, respondents evince “tradeoff resistance” – in particular, a resistance to trading off 
“priceless” goods such as health, life, or friendship for money.  Tradeoff effects (like moral 
preferences) are evidenced by protest votes or scope-insensitivity for the priceless goods.
134  
Whether tradeoff resistance is really a preference distortion depends on large issues about the 
incommensurability of welfare dimensions that I cannot pursue here.
135  But there is a plausible 
case that certain aspects of tradeoff resistance are irrational.  Finally, a variety of other distortions 
                                                 
130 See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 84-188 (1993). 
131 See, e.g., James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness to Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate Sensitivity to 
Probability? 18 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 33 (1999); Baron, supra note 102, at 74; Jane Beattie et al., On the 
Contingent Valuation of Safety and the Safety of Contingent Valuation: Part 1 – Caveat Investigator, 17 J. RISK & 
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132 The empirical literature on the WTP/WTA disparity is reviewed in John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A 
Review of WTP/WTA Studies, 44 J. ENVT’L ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2006).  There is a large theoretical literature about 
the sources of this disparity.  Two good discussions are FREEMAN, supra note 14, at 43-94; and Robert Sugden, 
Alternatives to the Neo-classical Theory of Choice, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 14, at 152. 
133 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1039 (1991).  It should be noted that the first two categories of preference distortion mentioned 
here may overlap.  Loss aversion, along with probability weighting, may explain departures from expected utility 
theory in processing probabilities.  See, e.g., REID HASTIE & ROBYN DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD 289-99 (2001).  Still, the distortions are partly distinct, in that loss aversion does not wholly explain 
probability distortions (probability weighting is also part of the picture), and affects choice under certainty. 
134 See Baron, supra note 102; Payne et al., supra note 112, at 257-58; Adler, supra note 22, at 37-38. 
135 See ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at ___; Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371 (1998).  
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have been observed in CV research – for example, a tendency to anchor on the initial bid in the 
auction format, or a “range bias” in the case of the payment card format.
136 
 
  QALY surveys have parallel distortions.  The “standard gamble” format assigns numbers to 
health states by asking respondents for a probability that makes them indifferent between a lottery 
over death and life, and the health state.  Respondents may fail to value such lotteries in 
accordance with expected utility theory.
137  The “time tradeoff” format asks respondents for the 
time span spent in a perfectly healthy state that is equivalent to the time in a diseased state.  This 
format demands a trade-off between life and health, one that respondents sometimes resist.
138  The 
simple rating format avoids both tradeoffs and probabilities, but may be characterized by “response 
spreading,” a kind of range bias: respondents feel impelled to use the whole zero-one scale, even 
where the health states being valued are quite similar.
139 
 
  Finally, there appear to be substantial preference distortions in standard happiness surveys. 
Kahneman’s work has emphasized a particular kind of distortion, the so-called “peak-end rule,” 
which apparently determines memories of temporally extended experiential episodes:  “[T]he 
remembered utility of pleasant or unpleasant episodes is accurately predicted by averaging the 
Peak (most intense value) of instant utility … recorded during an episode and the instant utility 
recorded near the end of the experience.”
140  The duration of the experience is ignored.  The peak-
end rule might be seen as a kind of availability heuristic, and indeed Kahneman suggests that the 
answers to questions such as “How satisfied are you with your life now?” are generally driven by 
the facts about their lives that are most “available” to respondents.
141   
 
Schwartz and Strack, in a comprehensive critical review of happiness surveys, identify a 
number of recurrent distortions.  They emphasize framing effects: for example, an individual who 
remembers a particular positive life event and construes it as part of her current life tends to give 
higher answers to questions about current happiness or life satisfaction than one who views it as 
part of her past life (thus a standard for comparison).  University freshmen told to remember 
something good that happened “two years ago” reported greater happiness than those told to 
remember something “two years ago, before you came to the university.”
142 
 
  How should preference distortions in CV, QALY and happiness surveys be handled?  One 
possibility is to employ debiasing measures.  A number of CV studies have sought to redress 
                                                 
136 See ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, supra note 14, at 138-39; Ian J. Bateman et 
al., Willingness-to-Pay Question Format Effects in Contingent Valuation Studies, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL 
PREFERENCES, supra note 14,  at 511, 512-16; Boyle, supra note 14, at 137-43; Venkatachalam, supra note 14, at 105-
10. 
137 See Brazier et al., supra note 26, at 30-34. 
138 See id. at 36-39.   A recent suggestion in the QALY literature is that both standard gamble and time-tradeoff values 
are also affected by loss aversion. See, e.g., Han Bleichrodt, A New Explanation for the Difference Between Time 
Trade-Off Utilities and Standard Gamble Utilities, 11 HEALTH ECON. 447 (2002). 
139 See Brazier et al., supra note 26, at 34-35. 
140 Kahneman, Back to Bentham, supra note 61, at 381. 
141 See Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 61, at 21 
142 See Schwarz & Strack, supra note 28, at 62-74.  
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probability distortions by employing devices to help respondents better grasp what probabilities 
mean, such as verbal analogies, pie charts, risk ladders, or graph paper with blacked-out squares.
143  
Probability aids are routinely used in eliciting QALY values when the standard gamble format is 
employed.
144  Research on the efficacy of these aids in reducing probability distortions is mixed.
145  
QALY and CV researchers should consider experimenting with more intensive probability 
debiasing techniques, for example familiarizing respondents with the axioms of expected utility 
theory (or whichever competitor account of rational choice under uncertainty is taken to be 
correct).  
 
  As for loss aversion:  CV researchers have tried to reduce the WTP/WTA disparity, a 
product (in part) of loss aversion, by using formats in which each subject’s valuation is repeatedly 
elicited -- on the theory that familiarity with the valuation task will reduce the extent of loss 
aversion. Again, results are mixed.
 146    Finally, it has been suggested that so-called “multi-
attribute utility theory” techniques, in which respondents are prompted to think through their 
internal tradeoff rates for the different attributes of choices that they care about, could reduce 
tradeoff biases in the CV context.
147  These sorts of techniques could also be used in QALY 
surveys.  Multi-attribute utility theory debiasing techniques would be most naturally paired with 
the conjoint-analysis approach to eliciting QALYs and CVs, which as discussed above are in wide 
use.   
  
  A second possible approach to preference distortions is to change elicitation method. For 
example, the anchoring bias characteristic of the auction format widely used in CV studies in the 
1970s and 1980s can be eliminated by shifting to payment cards or the open-ended question 
format, and can be reduced if not eliminated by shifting to other formats.
148  Carthy finds that a 
novel “chained” method for determining WTP/WTA for the risk of death reduces probability 
distortions
149; and Hammitt and Graham find the same for a novel “indifference risk” elicitation 
method that holds constant the price of a safety device and varies the risk reduction.
150 
 
 The QALY literature offers a striking illustration of the point that a given bias may be 
differentially problematic for different elicitation approaches.  The standard-gamble technique 
assigns QALY values to particular health states by asking respondents for their indifference 
probabilities; deviations from expected utility theory will therefore directly affect standard-gamble 
valuations.  By contrast, the time-tradeoff method eschews talk of lotteries, asking respondents to 
                                                 
143 See Phaedra S. Corso, Valuing Mortality-Risk Reduction: Using Visual Aids to Improve the Validity of Contingent 
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  A third, more radical debiasing possibility is to change the kind of welfare polling format 
entirely. I have argued at some length elsewhere that QALYs may, on balance, be a better basis for 
measuring the health and fatality impacts of policy choices than CV surveys.
152  Part of the 
advantage is that QALY surveys never ask respondents to value health or life in money – a 
particular demanding and emotionally laden tradeoff.   
 
A different advantage of QALYs is that policymakers’ valuations are constrained, by virtue 
of the additive formula used to value impacts, to be proportional to the amount of the impact.  
Scope-insensitivity is automatically circumvented.  Remember that the role of citizen responses to 
QALY surveys is to place health states on a 0-1 scale.  Those numbers are then incorporated into 
policy analysis by multiplying the change in health times the duration of the change.  For example, 
if a policy abates the effects of a toxin that causes a population of 10,000 individuals to suffer an 
uncomfortable respiratory condition, and does so for one month, and the value of the condition is 
0.85 on a 0-1 scale, then the policymaker’s valuation of the change would be 
(.15)×10,000×(1/12)=125 QALYs.  If the policy abates the toxin for a year rather than a month, 
then the QALY formula would automatically value that impact as 12 times the month-long impact, 
i.e., as 1500 QALYs.  By contrast, individuals asked for WTP to avoid a year rather than a month 
of the condition might well be in the grip of preference distortions that cause scope-insensitivity, 
and therefore fail to express valuations that are 12 times larger. 
 
  Kahneman’s proposal to use hedonic surveys to value moments of experience, and then 
have policymakers (not citizens) value temporally extended experiential episodes by aggregating 
momentary values, represents a closely analogous proposal to circumvent preference distortions by 
shifting welfare polling formats: in this case, shifting away from traditional happiness surveys.
153 
 
   
Mental Effort 
                                                 
151 See Adler, supra note 22, at 42; Sylvie M.C. van Osch et al., Correcting Biases In Standard Gamble and Time 
Tradeoff Utilities, 24 MED. DECISION MAKING 511, 515 (2004) (“The epithet of the SG as gold standard has faded 
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152 See Adler, supra note 22, at 24-42, 69-83. 
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Economic theory traditionally assumes that mental operations are costless and 
instantaneous. Survey respondents, on this model, have preexisting preference orderings over 
complete outcomes; they can costlessly process information, using it to ascribe probabilities to 
outcomes; and they can costlessly derive preferences over goods, choices, and so on from their 
underlying outcome-preferences and probabilities. If respondents were indeed costless 
computers, they might still lie about their preferences – truthtelling would still be a problem for 
welfare polls – but respondents would never have a reason to "shirk" in exerting mental effort. 
 
But the assumption of zero-cost computation is wildly unrealistic for actual humans.
154  It 
is therefore quite possible that respondents to welfare surveys will economize on mental effort. 
Problems of rational apathy, exhaustively discussed by economists in contexts such as voting,
155 
readily carry over to the construction of preferences and valuations, given realism about human 
mental abilities. Why should the participant in a QALY, happiness, or CV survey take much 
trouble to figure out how she ranks the health state on a 0-1 scale, how happy she is, or what her 
WTP/WTA for some good is, once she realizes that her particular response (truthful or not) has a 
vanishingly small chance of changing the governmental policy to which the survey will be an 
input? 
The problem of mental effort -- strategic laziness, as it were -- is little discussed by the 
welfare-polling literatures.
156    Scholarship about CVs almost completely ignores it, focusing a 
bright spotlight instead on the sister problem of strategic deception.  Strategic laziness surfaces to 
a limited extent in some of the critical literature on happiness studies, for example in the 
observation that the availability bias, which skews answers to standard happiness questions, is a 
heuristic device for answering such questions quickly and easily.
157 
 
Nor is mental effort a key focus of the general literature on survey design. There is a large 
subliterature on survey nonresponse.
158  But survey or individual item nonresponse – an outright 
refusal to answer the question -- is only one manifestation of conservation of mental effort. The 
psychologist Jon A. Krosnick, in an unusually good treatment of the problem of mental effort, 
discusses different ways in which survey respondents might "satisfice" rather than exert the 
mental energy required for a high-quality response, including "selecting the first response 
alternative that seems to constitute a reasonable answer," "agreeing with any assertion the 
interviewer makes," "endorsing the status quo instead of endorsing social change," "failing to 
                                                 
154 The locus classicus for discussions of bounded rationality is, of course, Herbert Simon’s scholarship.  See HERBERT 
SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982); HERBERT SIMON, 
MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1997).  For more recent work in this area, see, e.g., ARIEL RUBENSTEIN, 
MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1998); GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE  
US SMART (1999). 
155 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 303-332 (2003). 
156 See Adamowicz, supra note 18, at 435.  By contrast, the issue has been more fully discussed in the literature on 
policy deliberation.  Deliberation, after all, involves making a substantial effort to think about some issue.  See, e.g., 
Luskin et al., supra note 7, at 456-61. 
157 See, e.g., Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 61, at 21; Schwarz & Strack, supra note 28, at 63.  
158 See, e.g., DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD (2d ed. 2000); 
ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES, supra note 14, at 113-16, 177-79; ROBERT M. 
GROVES & MICK P. COUPER, NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS (1998); SURVEY NONRESPONSE 
(Robert M. Groves et al. eds., 2002).  
34
differentiate among a set of diverse objects in ratings," "saying `don't know' instead of reporting 
an opinion," and "randomly choosing among the response alternatives offered."
159 
 
If (1) lazily constructed valuations were normatively on a par with effortful valuations, or 
if (2) lazy valuations were statistically unbiased estimates of effortful valuations, then welfare 
pollsters wouldn't need to worry about laziness. But neither of these premises holds true. Mental 
effort, like good information, is normative for welfare: Outcome O1 is better for P than O2 only if 
P under sufficiently ideal conditions (including sufficient effort) prefers O1. Indeed, it would be 
incoherent to contemplate an idealized subject who must be presented with lots of information, 
but is free to apathetically ignore it. And (2) seems quite counterfactual. Information and 
measures to reduce preference distortion can surely systematically change preferences, at least for 
some groups and goods
160; therefore actual, distorted, poorly informed preferences will not (in 
some cases) be unbiased estimates of idealized preferences; therefore preferences constructed 
without efforts to absorb information or to participate in debiasing won't (at least for some goods 
and groups) be unbiased estimates of idealized preferences. 
 
A leading manual on CV studies, discussing the problem of nonresponse and protest 
responses (zero or very high WTP/WTA amounts), writes: 
 
[A]nalysts usually make the assumption that the true WTP of non-responders [and protest responders] will be 
similar to that quoted by households with comparable characteristics. 
 
Following the removal of non-respondents from the sample, therefore, analysts should ensure that 
the characteristics of the sample have not been systematically biased. Analysts should examine the 
distribution of key characteristics of households in the sample (for example, household income, age profiles, 
and access to the non-market good) and ensure that it does not differ significantly from the distribution of 
these characteristics in the population.
161 
 
This purely statistical technique may or may not be adequate to the problem of outright 
nonresponse, but it offers no solution to the problem that all or many responses may be 
marred by apathy. A solution to that problem, presumably, will mean designing surveys to 
trigger the motivators of mental effort. Krosnick suggests that these include: the extent to 
which respondents "get intrinsic rewards from effortful mental exercises"; "the degree to 
which the topic of a question is personally important to the respondent"; the extent to 
which respondents “think that the survey in which they are participating is important 
and/or useful to some segment of society”; "interviewer behavior"; the respondent's sense 
of "accountability" to the interviewer; and the length of the interview.
162 The general, and 
substantial survey literature on steps to reduce outright nonresponse rates will be helpful 
here, since the norms, emotions, interests and so on which motivate respondents to take 
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Welfare surveys will have epistemic value for regulators only if respondents are  
sufficiently rational and informed, and exert enough mental effort. But these are necessary, not 
sufficient conditions. After all, well-informed, rational, effortful respondents might well lie to 
their interviewers. The problem of eliciting truthful valuations has been discussed at some 
length in the CV literature,
164 less so in the other literatures.  Consider the simplest CV 
elicitation format: the open-ended question, which asks "How much are you willing to pay?" for 
some good. If the respondent prefers the good plus its predicted cost to her (for example, the 
predicted increase in her taxes) to not having the good, then she has an incentive to overstate her 
true WTP. A higher stated WTP increases the chance that the good will be provided, without 
changing its cost to her. More precisely: 
 
Faced with an open-ended question [about WTP for a public good], a very large WTP response does 
turn out to be the optimal strategy for an agent who believes (a) the cost of the public good to the agent is 
fixed, (b) her true willingness to pay for the good is larger than the cost if provided, and (c) the good is more 
likely to be supplied the larger the sum of the willingness to pay responses given by agents.
165 
 
Reacting to this problem, some scholars have sought to identify "incentive compatible" 
elicitation formats for CV surveys. A format is "incentive compatible" if respondents maximize 
their preference-satisfaction by truthfully stating their valuations. It turns out that, under some 
conditions, a dichotomous choice question will be incentive compatible. This is intuitively clear. If 
an individual is asked to vote in a referendum between the status quo and a single alternative, and 
she believes that her vote increases the chance of the selected option being implemented, then, 
pretty clearly, she best advances her preferences by voting for the option she actually prefers. 
Similarly, if an individual is asked, as per the dichotomous choice format, whether she prefers (a) 
having a good provided, at cost to her of $X, or (b) the status quo; and she believes that the 
governmental agency will pick one of these two options; and she believes that her statement to the 
interviewer raises the probability of the agency picking whichever option she claims to prefer; then 
she should truthfully articulate her preference.
166 
 
The research on "incentive compatibility" shows, further, that dichotomous-choice 
questions may not prompt truthful answers.
167 (Imagine a question where the respondent believes 
that, if the good is provided, she will not be taxed $X, but instead can choose voluntarily whether 
to pay anything.  In that case, she has an incentive to answer the question affirmatively, even if $X 
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exceeds her true WTP.) Finally, and most strikingly, it emerges that only dichotomous-choice 
questions will be incentive compatible. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, a deep result in social 
choice theory, shows that no other format will be.
168 
 
The apparent conclusion from this line of research is that contingent-valuation survey 
designers can address strategic bias by using the incentive-compatible variants of dichotomous 
choice question. Indeed, the prestigious NOAA panel on CVs makes precisely this 
recommendation: 
[T]he referendum format, especially when cast in the willingness to pay mode – "Would you be willing to ... 
be taxed ... D dollars to cover the cost of avoiding or repairing environmental damage X?" – has many 
advantages. It is realistic: referenda on the provision of public goods are not uncommon in real life. There is 
no strategic reason for the respondent to do other than answer truthfully ....
169 
 
But there is a problem. Consider the fully rational, self-interested individual whose valuation of 
cleaner air (say) is elicited by means of the supposedly incentive-compatible question: "Would you 
vote in favor of a measure to produce cleaner air, to be funded through taxes that will increase your 
tax bill by $X?" Imagine that the respondent believes the actual policy alternative on the table to be 
regulation of polluters, not taxation-and-spending for cleaner air, and believes that the cost of 
regulation to her (in higher product prices, say) will be $Y. Then she will answer the question 
affirmatively or negatively depending on how her valuation of cleaner air compares to $Y, not $X. 
 
Supposedly "incentive compatible" dichotomous choice CV questions pair policy 
measures on the government's agenda with hypothetical cost figures that are picked by the 
interviewer (and, usually, varied among respondents) so as to elicit valuations in a statistically 
efficient way. But this technique will elicit truthful valuations from a self-interested respondent 
only if the respondent misunderstands how the CV technique works – only if she believes the 
"cost" figure to be the interviewer's prediction of the measure's cost, rather than a hypothetical 
number – and, further, only if the respondent is gullible enough to believe this cost "prediction.”
170 
 
Robert Sugden, mindful of this difficulty, writes: “I can see no escape from the 
conclusion that, if survey respondents are motivated solely by rational self-interest, the CV 
method is fatally flawed.”
171 
 Presumably the conclusion carries over to happiness and QALY 
surveys, which use open-ended questions that seem even less likely than CV "referenda" to be 
incentive compatible. 
 
Does the conclusion sound the death knell for welfare polls? I suggest not. Incentive-
compatibility research about surveys has asked whether fully rational individuals, maximizing 
their preferences (specifically, in accordance with expected utility theory), and lacking a 
preference for truth-telling or the prospect of sanctions for lying, would answer truthfully. To begin, 
individuals may not be fully rational. Preference distortions – failures of full rationality – may 
actually help the polling enterprise, here. Actual respondents may not realize that lying is in their 
                                                 
168 More precisely, no other format can be incentive compatible unless the shape of preferences is restricted.  See id. at 
11, 31-32. 
169 Arrow et al., supra note 70, at 21. 
170 See Sugden, supra note 164, at 136-37. 
171 Id. at 137.  
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interest, or may not be up to the cognitive strain of keeping track of their lies.
172  As for sanctions: 
formal sanctions for lying are of course unavailable in the survey context, but social norms may 
come into play. “[T]he social setting of interviewer and interviewee [may] evoke[] norms of 
honesty.”
173  Relatedly, respondents may have some preference not to lie, and the interview 
format can be designed to take advantage of this preference — for example, by paying the 
respondent a token amount (which might strengthen guilt feelings about lying).
174 
Further, even if some (perhaps large) fraction of survey respondents do lie, that does not 
imply that survey responses are epistemically worthless. It is a large fallacy to leap from the 
premise that respondents are strategically misstating their preferences, to the conclusion that those 
misstatements have zero informational value for policymakers. For example, if the respondent has 
an incentive to overstate his valuations, the policymaker can infer that the respondent's true value 
is no higher than the stated value. Nonzero WTP responses to open-ended contingent-valuation 
questions might be seen by policymakers as upper bounds to true WTP amounts. 
  More generally, 
if stated valuation amounts are correlated, to some extent, with true valuations, rather than being 
random, then the statements will be useful to policymakers, to some extent, in updating their 
estimates of true valuations.  
Indeed, much evidence suggests that statements about valuations in welfare polls are 
correlated with respondents' true valuations: how they truly value the good, at the time of the 
statement. One body of research looks to correlations between stated preferences and behavior.
175  
In one particularly extensive study of this sort, Carson and co-authors performed a meta-analysis of 
studies that provided both CV and revealed preference estimates of the same good. They found that 
the average CV/RP ratio was .89, .77, or .92, depending on whether a complete, weighted, or 
trimmed sample was used, and that CV and revealed preference measures were substantially 
correlated using two standard measures of correlation.
176  Similar research has been done for 
happiness surveys, finding correlation between survey answers and non-self-report evidence of the 
respondent's happiness, such as assessments by spouses, family or friends; the duration of 
Duchenne smiles; heart rate, blood pressure, and skin resistance measures of stress; psychosomatic 
illnesses; and EEG measures of brain activity.
177  There is less work in this vein on QALYs.
178 But 
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there is "internal" evidence that responses to QALY surveys track underlying valuations to some 
extent: for example, intrarater reliability is high (respondents provide the same valuations over 
time); respondents give lower values to health states that are unambiguously more serious; and the 
standard-gamble and time-trade-off formats correlate reasonably well.
179 All of this would be 
puzzling if QALY responses were just random.  
 
A natural thought, given this evidence of the correlation between stated and true valuations, 
is that stated valuations should be adjusted by a "calibration" factor.  For example, if welfare polls 
on average produce CV values that are twice those evidenced by counterpart revealed preference 
studies, then policymakers could apply a 50% discount to CV values. Indeed, a substantial body of 
scholarship seeks to estimate such calibration factors.
180  A note of caution needs to be sounded: 
calibration factors derived from the correlation between stated preferences and behavioral evidence 
need to be used with care, because (as elaborated below, in Part IV) behavioral evidence is no gold 
standard for valuation. Among other things, the actors whose behaviors undergird revealed-
preference work may be poorly informed, may have distorted preferences, and may economize on 
mental effort. The first-best solution to problems of truthtelling would be to use norms and 
incentives to minimize deception; but if that seems unavailing, calibration factors offer a second-
best approach to deriving information about underlying valuations from welfare polls.
181 
 
A more general point. Welfare polls are just a small bit of a vast survey literature, 
encompassing political opinion polls, censuses, psychological surveys, and consumer-product 
research.  One estimate is that “[a]bout 20 million interviews are conducted each year in the 
United States.”
182 Many of these surveys are not incentive compatible — either because they are 
“inconsequential” (the response will not change what government or other actors do), or, if 
“consequential,” they give the respondent an incentive to lie.
183  Still, there remains great demand 
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for these surveys: by politicians, psychologists, and so on.
184  Consider, in particular, consumer 
product research — the closest parallel to welfare polls.  Incentive-compatibility problems afflict 
these surveys: for example, the respondent asked whether she would purchase a new widget at 
some price might as well say yes, even if her WTP for the widget is lower, since the widget's 
introduction into the market gives her a free option to buy it if her preferences change.
185  But 
firms continue to conduct these surveys, at substantial cost; if the surveys had little informational 
value about consumers' preferences, that would be surprising.
186   
 
The informational value of consumer product research has been confirmed by studies 
showing a correlation between the degree of interest in a new product expressed in surveys, and 
actual purchases of the product.
187  Correlational data of this sort is now regularly used to derive 
calibration factors for consumer surveys
188 – a close analogue to the use of calibration factors for 





Welfare polls will be informative to policymakers only if respondents answer the 
question posed in the survey, or (more precisely) answer the question that policymakers believe to 
be posed, or (more precisely yet) answer a question sufficiently close to that which policymakers 
believe to be posed. 
 Consider an extreme case: effortful, sincere, and well-informed respondents 
whose answers to valuation question I, which they take the survey to pose, are uncorrelated with 
their answers to valuation question II, which the pollster reads the survey as posing. 
Survey questions can be misunderstood for various reasons: 
[What follows are] the major classes of interpretive difficulty that survey designers encounter. The question's 
grammatical structure (its syntax) may be ambiguous or too complicated for respondents to take in. Lengthy 
or complex questions can exceed respondents' capacity to process them, resulting in misinterpretations . . . . 
The question's meaning (or semantics) may elude respondents if they misunderstand vague, unfamiliar, or 
ambiguous terms or if they are misled by inapplicable presuppositions. Finally, the intended use of the 
question (its pragmatics) may create difficulties . . . .
189 
 
It is trivial to see that syntactic problems could affect welfare polls, like all other surveys, and 
easy to see that semantic difficulties could as well. The standard-gamble and time-trade-off 
variants of the QALY technique ask respondents to use an esoteric method which they may not 
grasp, while the rating-scale asks respondents to locate health states on a 0-1 scale whose cardinal 
properties they may not understand. That latter problem affects happiness surveys too. And while 
respondents presumably do understand what dollars are, they may misconstrue the precise CV 
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question posed – for example, the frequency of the payment (annual/monthly/lifetime WTP), 
maximum versus minimum, and so on. 
As for the "pragmatics" of meaning: the problem here is that respondents may grasp the 
syntax and literal semantics of the survey question, but in virtue of communicative norms may 
interpret it non-literally. For example, a general question about life-satisfaction that follows a 
specific question about life-satisfaction in some domain ("How happy are you with your 
marriage?"), is naturally read to exclude that domain. Synonymous questions about happiness, if 
separated in a survey, will tend to receive the same answers; but if asked in succession are likely 
receive different answers, since respondents -- avoiding an interpretation that creates redundancy – 
will try to read them differently.
190 
The problem of misunderstood questions is, of course, a very general one for survey 
research, and a wide range of responses to the problem have been deployed. Traditionally, 
pollsters designed surveys using informal techniques such as "pretesting": giving the survey to a 
small group and developing an informal sense of the survey's problems.
191  Focus groups are a 
more elaborate way to do this. "Cognitive interviewing" is yet more elaborate. 
Ordinary interviews focus on producing codable responses to the questions. Cognitive interviews, by 
contrast, focus on providing a view of the processes elicited by the questions. Concurrent or retrospective 
think-alouds and/or probes are used to produce reports of the thoughts that respondents have either as they 
answer the survey questions or immediately after.
192 
Think of pretesting, focus groups, and cognitive interviews as second-order polling techniques: 
not techniques for eliciting valuations, but techniques for designing the first-order techniques. 
Second-order techniques also include second-order experiments: administering different trial 
surveys to different groups. There is now a large scholarly literature on second-order 
techniques,
193 and some of the more sophisticated approaches have percolated into welfare 
polls.
194 
Second-order techniques allow survey designers to identify and then reformulate 
misunderstood questions. More generally, they have diagnostic value with respect to most of the 
problems surveyed in this Part. Cognitive interviews, for example, can help reveal whether moral 
preferences are driving valuations; what respondents' informational state is; whether they are 
confused about probabilities, loss averse, or otherwise irrational; and whether they are making a 
mental effort.  
 
Representativeness 
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   There is a straightforward answer to worries about whether the respondents to welfare 
polls are representative of the relevant population: use random sampling techniques.  These 
techniques, like those for ensuring question comprehension, are part of the general armamentarium 
of survey design.
195   Indeed, the origins of polling in the United States are bound up with random 
sampling: George Gallup become famous because his random sample of a few thousand accurately 
predicted the outcome of the 1936 Presidential election while the Literary Digest’s sample, a large 




  Random samples can be expensive.   Nonrandom samples cost less -- for example, the 
notorious convenience samples of college students used in many psychological surveys; or a 
“quota sample” of shoppers intercepted at a mall, which is sometimes the sampling format for CV 
studies.
197  But the expense of random sampling is presumably justified for a welfare poll that is 
meant to inform major governmental decisions, let alone a general schedule of valuations – at least 
to the extent that it is important for the sample to be representative.   
 
Why this last caveat?   Variation in valuations may reflect (1) variation in objective 
circumstances, or (2) variation in preferences.  In the first case, having a representative sample is 
crucial.  Imagine, for example, a CV survey to value some policy that will clean up a park.  The 
population of park users will vary in their objective circumstances – how they interact with the 
park.  A sample skewed toward intensive users, or those whose uses are especially sensitive to 
aesthetics, will tend to overstate the average CV of the overall population of park users.  By way of 
contrast, consider a QALY survey where all the participants are told about a particular hypothetical 
health state and asked to value that (not their own health).  Here, there is variation in preferences 
but not objective circumstances, and it may be more important to have a high quality sample 
(respondents who are well informed, nondistorted, and so on), rather than a representative one.
198  
In any event, to the extent that welfare polls ought to reflect the valuations of the U.S. citizenry as 
a whole, or some geographically or functionally defined subset, random sampling techniques are 
available – and indeed regularly employed by CV, QALY, and happiness researchers alike. 
 
 
Deliberative Welfare Polls as a Solution? 
 
  Current practice is to administer welfare polls individually.  Focus groups may be used to 
fine-tune the questionnaires, but the ultimate valuations and other data are derived from subjects 
responding solo, each separated from the other respondents.  This is, of course, the general practice 
for policy surveys too, such as political opinion polls that ask for a stance about an issue before the 
government.  The central thrust of the literature on “policy deliberation formats,” as I term them – 
citizen juries, deliberative polls, citizen advisory boards, planning cells – is that group deliberation 
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about policy questions can improve on solitary policy polling.
199  Mightn’t the same be true for 
welfare polls?   
 
Consider that the scholars who favor deliberative-polling formats do so because they 
believe that structured group discussion can overcome informational, cognitive, motivational, and 
interpretive problems that afflict individual polls.  If the solo-to-group shift has this benefit in the 
policy context, wouldn’t it also in the welfare context?  A single presentation by an expert to the 
respondents assembled en masse is a cheap way to provide them information.  Debiasing 
techniques can also be thus cheaply presented; further, and more profoundly, group discussion 
itself is (or may be) a kind of debiasing.  Lazy or deceptive types may find these postures harder to 
sustain in the face of group monitoring or collective enthusiasm for the valuation task.  
Misunderstandings about the meanings of questions can be sorted out in conversation. 
  
In short, we should consider the possibility of deliberative welfare polls: survey techniques 
that incorporate collective discussions about QALY, CV, happiness, or other welfare valuations, 
with ancillary informational, debiasing, and question-clarifications techniques administered to the 
group, culminating perhaps in a collective verdict, perhaps in individual responses informed by the 
group deliberation.  In fact, this is not a new idea.  CV scholars have toyed with this very idea, 
calling it “deliberative monetary valuation.” 
 
  DMV [deliberative monetary valuation] is the use of formal deliberation concerning an environmental 
impact in order to express value in monetary terms for policy purposes, and more specifically as an input to 
CBA.   For example, consider a proposal to build a new road through a wilderness area …. A group of 
citizens would be selected and meet to discuss information about the environmental damages associated 
with the development. The citizens would form a jury aiming to provide a monetary value for 
environmental damages which might be in terms of an individual willingness to accept compensation to 
allow the project to proceed.
200 
 
A few of these group-deliberative CV studies have actually been conducted, although they remain 
very unusual.
201   
 
It has been objected, by authors sympathetic to policy-deliberation formats, that “the DMV 
approach … is restricted to producing a monetary value .… The environment is still regarded as a 
commodity under DMV which crowds out civic virtues.”
202  But this is really a generic objection 
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to all welfare polls, both traditional solo polls and group-based formats such as DMV; it hardly 
shows why welfare polls, if they are justifiably conducted, are best conducted without inter-
respondent deliberation. 
 
  A different objection, more to the point, is that the valuations produced by deliberative 
welfare polls are, on balance, lower quality than traditional valuations – because groups will be too 
small to produce statistically representative results; because groups can work together to figure out 
strategic responses; because groups “go to extremes.”
203  These objections may be apt – but what is 
harder to see is why the objections would apply differentially to policy and welfare polling formats.  
Plausibly: Citizen juries trump opinion polls if and only if deliberative welfare polls trump solo 
surveys.  Perhaps that is strong.  In any event, the literature on deliberative polling provides a rich 
set of group-based techniques that might be incorporated into the practice of welfare polling 
without abandoning its basic focus on well-being.  
 
IV. WELFARE POLLS: A DEFENSE 
 
The Article, up to this point, has been largely descriptive. Part II described the various 
roles that welfare polls currently play, or might plausibly play, in administrative governance. 
Part III comprehensively reviewed the informational, cognitive, motivational, communicative, 
and strategic obstacles to using surveys in the elicitation of welfare valuations, and the possible 
solutions to these difficulties. 
 
This Part is normative. Synthesizing the material from the preceding two parts, I present a 
moderate defense of welfare polling and entertain general objections, from two quarters -- first the 
"revealed preference" tradition in economics which is generally skeptical of surveys, and second 
the deliberative-democratic tradition in political theory which is skeptical of questions about 
preference, interest, or welfare rather than the public good. 
 
Weak Welfarism and the Need for Welfare Information 
 
Let us distinguish, to begin, between the moral relevance of well-being to administrative 
choice, and its legal relevance.  Eric Posner and I have elsewhere argued at length for the moral 
view we term “weak welfarism.”
204  Weak welfarism says that overall well-being is one of the 
moral considerations that bear on governmental choice, but may not be the only such 
consideration. Formally, morality has the structure {W*, F1, ... FM}, where W* is overall well-
being, and M ≥ 0. The Fi are possible moral considerations other than the maximization of 
aggregate well-being: for example, the protection of moral rights, the promotion of intrinsic 
environmental values, or the equitable distribution of well-being. 
 
Weak welfarism, unlike utilitarianism or stronger variants of welfarism, eschews a 
monomaniacal focus on welfare. Utilitarianism insists that overall well-being is the sole morally 
relevant consideration. It has the structure {W*}. The strong kind of welfarism popular among 
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economists,
205 and defended by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in a recent, high-profile book,
206 
allows for distributive considerations but insists that only information about well-being is relevant 
to moral evaluation. According to Kaplow and Shavell, morality has the structure {W1 .. Wn}, 
where each Wi is sensitive only to facts about welfare. 
 
Weak welfarism, by contrast, allows that morality overall may well be sensitive to non-
welfare facts – in the form of factors F1 ... FM, which may well focus on aspects of individual 
lives or outcomes other than well-being.  Moral rights and intrinsic environmental values would 
be the obvious candidates for such non-welfarist moral factors.
207 But weak welfarism insists 
that well-being is an integral part of moral evaluation, in virtue of factor W*. 
 
To be sure, this moral discussion doesn't speak directly to the questions of legal obligation 
and authority that primarily concern governmental officials and legal scholars. Law and morality 
can come apart. Only a pure natural-law view – a view generally rejected by modern jurisprudents 
– would say otherwise. Weak welfarism is an account of the structure of morality, not a legal 
framework. Weak welfarism, if true, establishes that governmental officials are morally required to 
be sensitive to well-being. It doesn't establish that they are legally required or even legally 
permitted to do so. 
 
In practice, however, administrative agencies are legally required or at least permitted to 
take account of well-being. First, agency organic statutes frequently use open-ended language that 
legally directs (or at least permits) agencies to pick the policy that maximizes overall welfare.
208 
Second, statutes that do not take this open-ended, balancing form still might focus agencies on 
some aspect of welfare – for example, health and safety – and indeed frequently do.
209  Third, 
although statutes sometimes fit neither the first template nor the second – for example, statutes 
that take the form of “rules” rather than “standards,” directing agencies' attention onto features of 
the world more readily ascertainable than welfare impacts
210 – all statutes have some degree of 
open-texture, some area where agencies have legal discretion.
211  It is both morally and legally 
appropriate for agencies to take account of well-being in resolving the discretionary choices that 
inevitably present themselves. Fourth, and a bit more concretely, the presidential cost-benefit 
orders, in place now for 25 years, have imposed a legal obligation on executive agencies – flowing 
from the President's legal powers to oversee executive agency decisionmaking -- to consider 
overall welfare where that is statutorily permissible.
212  Fifth, although administrative officials' 
legal and moral obligations are distinct, Congress can always merge them. For example, Congress 
can amend particular organic statutes, converting them to the open-ended balancing form or the 
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form that requires agencies to focus on some aspect of welfare. Or it can pass (and indeed has 
considered passing) a welfare super-mandate that would give statutory teeth to the general legal 
obligation to consider overall welfare now embodied in the Presidential cost-benefit orders.
213 
 
In short, questions about human well-being have substantial relevance, moral and legal, to 
administrative governance. This basic observation synthesizes the different functions for welfare 
surveys discussed in Part II. To begin, where legally permitted, agencies should use policy-
analytic techniques that help them ascertain which policy maximizes overall well-being or, 
alternatively, which one maximizes the particular aspect of well-being that is statutorily 
salient.
214 Cost-benefit analysis is the most obvious such technique and, currently, the one most 
widely employed by agencies. But there are others. Agencies might maximize QALYs. Or, they 
might adjust longevity for happiness rather than health, and maximize happy life-expectancy. 
Further, cost-benefit analysis is really a family of techniques, rather than a single rigid formula. 
Thus a variety of welfare polling formats, not just CV studies, can inform cost-benefit analysis -- 
for example, through QALY-to-dollar conversions (now a regular practice at the FDA) or 
happiness-to-dollar conversions (currently a topic of scholarly work). 
 
It may also be legally and morally appropriate for agencies to take into consideration the 
distribution of welfare. This suggestion raises large issues that lie beyond the scope of this Article 
-- about the item whose fair distribution morality requires, and about the optimal institutional  
structure for redistribution.
215  Still, it is as least plausible that (1) fair distribution means the fair 
distribution of well-being and (2) agencies in general, not just legislatures or the specialized 
agencies involved with the tax-and-transfer system, should concern themselves with the 
distribution of well-being. Just as welfare polls can inform administrative policy-analytic 
techniques that seek to maximize well-being or some of its aspects, so they can inform 
distributive analysis by agencies or other governmental bodies.
216 
 
Agencies do more than analyze and implement policy choices. They must often inform the 
public about the choices at hand, or about the current state of the world. Choices and outcomes 
can be characterized in various ways. Weak welfarism helps on this score, suggesting that 
governmental communications to the public should, morally, include welfare information; and 
such communications may also be legally required or permitted.  Concretely, the policy impact 
statements such as those required by NEPA in the case of agency decisions that affect the 
environment, or the general "statement of basis and purpose" required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act whenever an agency proposes a substantive rule, can and should describe welfare 
impacts. And the periodic statistics about the polity which governmental offices announce might 
include data about welfare, for example in the form of national well-being accounts.
217 
 
Nothing said to this point hinges on the specific content of administrative regulations. 
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Those regulations might be opaque to welfare. In some contexts, an agency maximizes overall 
welfare by promulgating a rule for private actors that does not itself make reference to welfare — 
instead, for example, instructing those actors to use a specified technology, or to achieve a 
particular performance specified in natural rather than well-being units.  But, sometimes, 
regulations are (partly or wholly) transparent to welfare. The clearest example are regulations that 
impose a monetary exaction on some private activity, where the amount of the exaction (variously 
called a "tax," "fine," "fee" or "damages") depends on the welfare cost of the activity to third 
parties. A related example is suggested by environmental trading markets. Private actors might be 
allocated tradeable credits for beneficial activities (for example, refraining from pollution), with 
the amount of the credit dependent on the welfare cost of the activity. In both of these contexts, 




To be sure, welfare polls are not costless undertakings. The elements of a well-designed 
survey can be expensive: academics or other individuals with expertise in the relevant good, in 
valuation, and in survey design must spend time in drafting the poll; focus groups or other 
second-order techniques must be undertaken to test it; interviewers may need to be hired to 
conduct the survey; respondents may need to be compensated, and in any event the use of their 
time is an economic cost; and econometricians will need to glean valuations from completed 
surveys. But in some cases – for example, the design of a major policy with large anticipated 
impacts – the expected welfare benefits of conducting a specific survey will outweigh the 
expected costs. And, more generally– a point I have reiterated in preceding parts –the costs of 
surveys can be spread over multiple decisions: by applying a single survey to a multiplicity of 
similar policies, or by using a few very high-quality surveys to estimate a general schedule of 
valuations for different types of impacts, or a general “benefits function.” 
 
The Revealed Preference Objection to Welfare Polling 
 
  The argument thus far, synthesizing the material in Part II, shows that governmental 
officials are (morally and legally) justified in securing information about well-being. It doesn't yet 
establish that government is justified in securing that information through welfare polls. This 
brings us to the various obstacles to welfare polling surveyed in Part III. Why welfare polls rather 
than other techniques – in particular, deriving valuations from behavioral evidence? 
 
A population's valuations for some good might be inferred in two generic ways: through 
“stated preference” techniques, which ask members of the population to say what their valuations 
are; or through “revealed preference” techniques, which infer valuations from the population's 
behaviors, more precisely their non-verbal behaviors, such as their transactional activities or their 
locational, occupational, or recreational choices. The most important revealed-preference 
technique in economics is, of course, to use observed demand and supply curves in markets for 
private goods to infer consumer and supplier valuations for these marketed goods.
219  This 
technique is so pervasive that scholarship about the choice between revealed-preference and 
stated-preference approaches to valuation often does not include it in the first category; but of 
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course it sits squarely there. Inferring P's value for X from the amount that P actually pays or 
receives for X is the quintessential measurement tool of applied welfare economists. 
 
The other commonly employed revealed-preference techniques seek to infer valuations of 
public goods, or of private goods that are not separately marketed, from observed activities. The 
leading examples, here, are travel cost techniques (which infer the recreational and other use 
values of sites such as wilderness areas from the costs in time and travel expense that individuals 
are willing to incur to visit the sites); property value approaches (which use the correlation 
between housing prices at different sites and environmental quality at those sites to infer 
valuations of environmental quality); hedonic wage techniques (which infer worker valuations of 
job characteristics, typically fatality risks, from the correlation between those characteristics and 
wages); and defensive behavior techniques (which infer valuations of health states from behavior 
to avoid or mitigate illness, such as seeking medical care, purchasing safety devices such as 




Many economists, particularly outside the areas of environmental and health economics, 
reflexively prefer these sorts of revealed preference techniques to stated preference techniques. 
Unlike mainstream psychologists, who are perfectly comfortable with probing mental states by 
asking patients to talk, much of the economics profession remains suspicious of surveys, at least 
surveys about subjective states such as preferences. 
 
Many surveys contain a wealth of subjective questions that are at first glance rather exciting.  Examples 
include ... "How satisfied are you with yourself?"; or "How satisfied are you with your work?" Yet despite 
easy availability, this is one data source that economists rarely use. In fact, the unwillingness to rely on such 
questions marks an important divide between economists and other social scientists.
221  
 
This generic suspicion of subjective surveys has fueled much of the opposition to the CV 
method.
222 
 And it surfaces in the current OMB guidance concerning cost-benefit analysis, which 
allows agencies to use surveys but places them lower in the hierarchy of sources than behavioral 
data. 
 
Other things equal, you should prefer revealed preference data over stated preference data because revealed 
preference data are based on actual decisions, where market participants enjoy or suffer the consequences of 
their decisions. This is not generally the case for respondents in stated preference surveys, where respondents 
... may be inclined to bias their responses for one reason or another.
223  
The revealed-preference objection to welfare polling might be framed in two forms: strong 
(noncomparative) or weak (comparative). The strong, noncomparative objection is that welfare 
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surveys provide essentially no information about a population's valuations.  They are no more 
informative than responses to gibberish questions. To put the noncomparative objection formally: 
the rational official's beliefs about the population's valuations are no different after the survey than 
before. 
 
The noncomparative objection to welfare polls is a bit of a straw man – although some of 
the critical literature comes pretty to making this strong claim.
224  And the claim seems less 
extreme once it is recognized that valuations are a matter of idealized preferences, a point I have 
already stressed. P's statements about what he currently wants might be no better than noise as 
evidence of his hypothetical, fully informed, fully rational preferences. 
 
Still, the strong objection to welfare polls seems overstated. A crucial point is that the 
"consumers" of the polls – government officials – are themselves imperfectly informed. An already 
omniscient social planner's estimates of a given population's valuations wouldn't be altered by 
welfare surveys, but the head of EPA's office of policy analysis isn't God. Imagine a policy analyst 
who wants to estimate a population's valuations of some good and has not yet examined any 
specific valuation studies, either revealed preference or stated preference studies. Her current 
estimates are shaped by introspection (a sense of what she would prefer); by the unsystematic 
observation of others' value-revealing behaviors and utterances that will occur over the course of 
any normal human life; and perhaps by the general theoretical literatures, in economics, 
philosophy, and psychology, on rationality, preference-formation and well-being. Relative to this 




But what of the comparative objection that welfare polls are dominated by revealed-
preference studies? Think of the objection this way: for the policy analyst whose estimates of a 
population's valuations are shaped both by the general background data just described 
(introspection/experience/general theory), plus specific revealed-preference studies, welfare polls 
do not typically furnish substantial new data. 
 
One traditional answer to this sort of question is that welfare polls can elicit valuations 
that will not be reflected in behavior. Specifically, proponents of CV studies often argue that 
these can be employed to measure environmental "nonuse" values, which may be difficult or 
even impossible to estimate with revealed-preference methods. 
 
CV surveys measure the total value of the described good while revealed preference techniques, 
which are based on observed behavior in private markets related to the environmental good, measure only 
direct use value. Revealed preference techniques are usually only capable of capturing . . . the direct use 
portion of total value, because they rely on the availability of an implicit private market for a characteristic of 
the good in question. . . . In contrast, passive use value can be seen as simply a special case of a pure public 
good.
226 
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The problem with this traditional defense of welfare polls is twofold. First, it doesn't apply to 
welfare polls that inquire about the multifold aspects of welfare that are evidenced by behavior, for 
example CV studies that focus on health, recreation, visibility, and other "use" values, or QALY 
and happiness studies generally. Second, as argued earlier, "nonuse" values often arise from moral 
or disinterested preferences. Shocking as this may sound to the environmental economists who 
have done much to develop the CV technique, a well-designed study to estimate welfare 
valuations should try to screen out disinterested preferences, and ignoring "nonuse" values is a 
practicable way to do that.  
 
What we need, in short, is an argument for why welfare polls have substantial evidentiary 
value, as compared to revealed preference techniques, in estimating use values – preferences for 
features of outcomes that derive from the subject's own self-interest, quintessentially preferences that 
entail a physical interaction (a "use"). The existing literature, focused on the comparative 
advantages of welfare polls for estimating nonuse values, does not furnish this argument. But I 
believe such an argument can be furnished, as follows.
227 
 
To begin, revealed preference studies raise special problems of measurement. The ultimate 
objective of any valuation study is to estimate a numerical measure of the strength of some 
subject's subjective preference, on some numerical scale (QALY, dollar, happiness, or other), for 
some good. Welfare polls inquire directly about the strength of preference, and intervene to shape 
and correct the subject's perception of the good (by providing information, by characterizing the 
good as a package of attributes, and so on.) Revealed preference techniques eschew these questions 
and interventions, and therefore run up against distinctive measurement obstacles that welfare 
polls can avoid — at least if subjects are truthful and at least if they absorb the information 
provided by the pollster, points to be returned to in a moment. 
 
One large measurement problem involves the gap between preferences (an unobservable 
mental state) and action. Consider the very simplest example: estimating average WTP for a 
marketed good among a population currently consuming the good in a competitive market. All the 
consumers are observed paying the same price P for the good; but of course it is not the case that 
each consumer is willing to pay P for the good or that P is the average WTP. Rather, P is the WTP 
of the "marginal" consumer, the one who values the good the least. 
 
A slightly more complicated example, again from the heartland of revealed preference 
work -- market behavior.  Imagine that the price of the marketed good X decreases from P to P'; 
consumer incomes, and the prices of all other goods, remain the same. What is aggregate consumer 
WTP for this change in price? It is tempting to say that, at least if we can observe the demand curve 
for X, the aggregate WTP is simply the change in area under the demand curve — the change in 
ordinary consumer surplus. It turns out (for fairly fundamental reasons in demand theory) that this 
is not true. Rather, aggregate WTP is the change in area under the "Hicksian" or "income 
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compensated" demand curve, an unobservable entity that separates the substitution and income 
effects of a price change. A very substantial literature in applied economics discusses the 
conditions under which the change in consumer surplus is a good approximation for aggregate 
WTP for a price change and, if not, what other techniques (usually involving assumptions about 
the shape of utility functions) can be used.
228  
 
The problem of estimating the subject's beliefs about the good being valued is a different, 
and equally pervasive, problem for revealed preference techniques. The ultimate objective of a 
revealed preference study or welfare poll is to determine how some good, with characteristics C1* 
... Cn*, or a change in some good from characteristics C1* ... Cn* to C1+ ... Cn+, is valued by some 
group of subjects. That information will feed into policy analysis, government communications, 
and the design of fines and fees, as discussed above and documented in detail in Part II. But 
observing how a subject behaves in the vicinity of a good that actually has those characteristics, or 
in response to an actual change of that sort, doesn't directly evidence the valuation, because the 
subject might misperceive the good or change. If we eschew discursive measures (asking the 
subject how he sees the good), then we must assume that the perception is accurate (an heroic and 
unwarranted assumption) or somehow (again without discursive evidence) posit a function 
correlating perceived and actual characteristics.  
 
This problem recurs in the literature on revealed preference techniques. Consider property 
value models. To quote a leading textbook on applied economics, a crucial question to be asked in 
using these methods is the following: “Is there sufficiently close correspondence between people's 
perceptions of amenity levels (which presumably govern the choices reflected in property prices) and 
the objective measures of amenity levels that are available to the researcher?”
229  Ditto for travel 
cost models. 
Objective measures of [site] quality are reproducible .. However people might make choices about recreation 
on the basis of their perceptions of quality rather than the objective measure. If individuals' perceptions are 
functions of objective measures and personal characteristics, then it may be possible to estimate a `perception 
function' and to use this function to model choices and measure welfare values.
230 
Or consider the use of hedonic wage models or defensive behavior models to estimate WTP to 
avoid risk, a very standard use. A critical problem here is that the objective risk associated with a 
job or a defensive behavior, and the risk perceived by the worker or actor, may be different. 
“Valuation methods [for risk] based on revealed preference have the virtue of relying on actual 
behavior but can be applied only when the analysts knows (or can reasonably infer) what 
decision alternatives and consequences (including their pecuniary, health, and other attributes) 
were perceived by the decision maker.”
231  
A third, general, measurement problem for revealed preference techniques is that of 
determining valuations for counterfactual goods. Imagine that a policy will change the attributes 
of some marketed or nonmarketed good from C1* ... Cn* to C1++, C2* ... Cn*  If existing goods 
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of this sort never attain C1++, or if C1++ is attained but typically bundled with changes in the 
good's other characteristics, using revealed-preference techniques to measure the value of the 
hypothesized good may be very difficult.  
  [Revealed preference] methods ... [suffer] on the grounds that the new situation (after the environmental 
quality change) may be outside the current set of experiences (or outside the data range) .... [And they] may 
suffer from collinearity among attributes. Collinearity precludes the isolation of factors affecting choice.  . . . 
For example, water quality attributes (BOD, turbidity, etc) may be correlated but the economic valuation may 
only be interested in valuing an improvement in one of the attributes.
232 
  A similar point holds about consumer preferences for currently nonexistent products that a firm 
might introduce, and indeed is a major reason for the use of surveys in market research.  “[I]f 
Doritos were to create a new spicy salsa-flavor chip as a line extension, by definition no purchase 
data would exist because the snack food would not have been available yet for purchase.”
233  
A final measurement problem is this.  "Revealed preference" methods standardly use the 
observed cost of a good to some subject as a step in estimating the subject's valuations. If the good 
is marketed and the consumer pays for it out of pocket, the cost is pretty straightforward: its price. 
If the good is not marketed, estimating cost may be more complicated. This is a key problem for 
travel cost studies, where cost equals the direct and opportunity costs of traveling to the site; the 
solution has been to survey site users about crucial travel details (for example, where the trip 
originated and what the user’s income is).  Or the good may be marketed, but the consumer may be 
insured – so that its price will exceed his cost.  In particular, inferring WTP for health from the 
prices of health care services or products is very tricky, given the wide existence of health 
insurance. 
Let us turn, now, to the second set of reasons why welfare polls have informational value 
even with revealed preference studies in the picture. The first set of reasons, just discussed, have 
to do with measurement. The second have to do with the idealizing conditions for valuation. 
Those conditions, again, are that the subjects be self-interested; be well-informed; have 
undistorted preferences; and exert sufficient mental effort. Real world actors can, of course, fall 
short on all these dimensions. And while revealed-preference techniques offer some 
opportunities, by a judicious selection of goods or subjects, to screen out problematic preferences, 
they eschew the full range of interventions that welfare polls can utilize. 
Consider, to begin, the problem of disinterested preferences. Revealed preference 
techniques can partly address this problem by ignoring goods for which preferences are mainly 
moral or otherwise disinterested. The classic example is nonuse values for environmental goods. 
But preferences for experienced goods can also be partly disinterested. A good example is risk.  
Hedonic wage studies that infer WTP from wage premia for riskier jobs are problematic, in part, 
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because workers may be incurring risk out a sense of responsibility to family.
234  Ditto for 
individuals who purchase safety devices (particularly if those devices directly benefit family 
members and not just the individual, as in the case of safer cars or appliances).
235 
Admittedly, as discussed in Part III, welfare pollsters do not seem to have experimented 
much with discursive devices for screening out disinterested preferences.
236  Currently, 
therefore, with respect to the problem of self-interest, the choice between revealed and stated 
preference techniques is pretty much a wash. If successful discursive screening devices are 
developed, these would be one comparative advantage (among the others here discussed) of 
welfare polls. 
Turn, now, to the problem of information. Clearly, the actors in revealed-preference 
studies may lack an idealized stock of information
237 — a problem already touched upon, in my 
discussion of the gap between the true and perceived characteristics of goods.  Focusing the study 
on well-informed actors is a possibility, but the relevant facts may not be widely known, or known 
only by a nonrepresentative segment of the population, creating problems of sample size or 
statistical bias. Here, current welfare polling techniques, as described in Part III, do offer an 
important advantage. Those include telling respondents more about the good at stake; deleting 
welfare-irrelevant information; and characterizing the good as a bundle of locations along 
different dimensions of welfare, as in conjoint analysis. A more experimental possibility is 
switching from solo to group surveys, so as to disseminate information cheaply.
238 
 
A parallel analysis applies to the problem of preference distortion. To begin, it is clear that 
preferences measured in behavioral studies are distorted. Consider the major distortions that affect 
welfare polls, discussed in Part III: deviations from the expected utility model for processing 
probabilities, loss aversion, and resistance to trading off different dimensions of well-being. All of 
these are pervasive features of human decisionmaking
239 and are hardly confined to welfare polls. 
For example, the literature on consumer behavior shows that each of the distortions characterizes 
individuals purchasing marketed goods.   Consumers often make probabilistic decisions in 
accordance with prospect theory, a model of choice which seems descriptively much more 
accurate than expected utility theory.
240  “[D]ecision makers choose more optional features in a 
consumer choice (e.g., air conditioning in an automobile) when they are given a fully loaded 
model and asked to delete options they do not want than when they are given a base model and 
asked to add options at additional cost” (loss aversion).
241  John Payne and co-authors have 
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extensively documented tradeoff aversion in consumer choice.  If a few simple axioms are 
satisfied, rationality would require that consumers resolve purchase decisions involving products 
with attributes along multiple dimensions by employing a “weighted additive” method: weighting 
each dimension, scoring the products on the different dimensions, determining an overall score for 
each product, and choosing the product with the highest score.
242  But consumers regularly fail to 
engage in weighted additive decisionmaking and instead use methods such as satisficing or 
lexicographic choice — either to economize on mental effort, or to avoid thinking about trade-off 
rates for dimensions (such as health or life) that are particularly important.
243 
 
The other distortions that have raised concerns about welfare polls — framing, anchoring, 
availability, range effects — have also been observed in consumer behavior. 
244  More generally, 
all of the distortions that characterize consumers also presumably characterize visitors to parks, 
purchasers of properties with environmental amenities or disamenities, workers considering risky 
jobs, and individuals mitigating or averting disease states -- the individuals whose behaviors are 
studied by travel-cost, property value, hedonic wage, and defensive behavior techniques, 
respectively. 
As with information, revealed preference methods can try to circumvent distortions by 
focusing on the behavior of unusually rational types – but that creates sample size and bias issues. 
By contrast, welfare polling currently offers a range of techniques for reducing distortion, 
discussed in Part III. To recap the discussion there: direct debiasing techniques have had some 
mixed success; more successful may be changing elicitation format, or changing the kind of scale 
entirely, for example switching from CV to QALY surveys to overcome tradeoff biases in 
valuing health states, or switching from standard happiness studies to Kahneman's moment-based 
surveys to overcome availability biases. And switching from solo to group surveys may help to 
facilitate debiasing, just as it may help to disseminate information cheaply.
245 
 
Finally, real-world actors do economize on mental effort. In particular, as just mentioned, 
an important focus of research into consumer choice has been to document how the fact of 
bounded rationality – the fact that humans cannot instantly and effortlessly retrieve items from 
memory, process new information, and perform computations -- produces heuristics.
246  
Admittedly, respondents to welfare polls have an additional, strategic incentive to eschew effort 
that consumers and other actors considering choices with significant personal effects lack. 
Consumers will internalize the benefits of their incremental mental efforts; survey respondents 
will not. On the other hand, as discussed in Part III, the polling format can presumably intensify 
the internal and social pressures which induce additional effort – by remunerating respondents for 
their answers, by using face-to-face interviews rather than mail or internet surveys, and (once 
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more) by shifting from solo to group formats.
247 
 
To sum up: the comparative objection to welfare polling fails. Welfare polls can provide 
substantial new information to the (nonomniscient!) policy analyst, given the limitations of 
revealed preference methods with respect to measurement and the idealizing conditions for 
valuation (information, nondistortion, self-interest, mental effort).
248  
 
My response to the revealed-preference objection assumes, to be sure, that the 
communicative difficulties which are unique to welfare polls – respondent misunderstanding of 
the question asked, on the one hand, and a lack of truthfulness in answering the question, on the 
other – do not cancel their informational value. If the respondents to these polls assigned semantic 
content to the questions asked which didn't correlate with their objective semantic content, or if 
the respondents understood the questions but provided untruthful answers that didn't correlate with 
their real preferences, the revealed-preference objection to welfare polling (indeed, in its strong, 
noncomparative form) would be persuasive. 
 
To begin, it should be underscored that the possibility of respondent misunderstanding and 
strategic deception, along with that of strategic laziness, is hardly unique to welfare polls, but 
generalizes to all sorts of surveys – political polls, psychological surveys, consumer research, and so 
on. Presumably the various "consumers" of these surveys, often quite savvy (politicians, firms), 
wouldn't use them if respondent lying, shirking, and misunderstanding seriously undercut their 
informational value.  
 
Why doesn't this happen? Shirking has been already been discussed.  Avoiding 
misleading questions has been intensively studied by polling scholars, and a large set of second-
order techniques (pretesting, focus groups, cognitive interviews) are available.
249 
 
As for the problem of strategic deception: the discussion in Part III suggested that the 
attempt to design "incentive compatible" formats is probably a dead end. 
 A better answer to 
worries about truth-telling points to bounded rationality and norms. Boundedly rational 
individuals may find it too difficult to maintain a consistent pattern of lies (particularly in the face 
of questions designed to test for the consistency of preferences), and anyone may feel internal or 
social pressure to tell the truth. Surveys can, again, be designed to intensify this pressure. The fact 
that stated valuations correlate with behaviorally inferred valuations underscores the 
informational value of surveys. If respondents were not constrained (by norms, internal pressure, 
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incentive-compatible design, or whatever) to state their actual preferences, or at least valuations 
that (true or not) are systematically related to their actual preferences, then this observed 
correlation would be very puzzling. Finally, and reciprocally, stated valuations need not be 
accurate to be informative. Inaccurate but nonrandom statements also have evidentiary value. 
Ideally, survey design would induce truthtelling; but a cruder, second-best solution is to use 
calibration factors to adjust for various factors that drive a wedge between stated and actual 
valuations.
250  
The Deliberative Democracy Objection 
 
Let us turn, then, to the second general objection to welfare polling: call it the 
“deliberative democracy” or "civic republican" objection. This objection, like the revealed-
preference objection, has emerged most clearly in the critical literature about CV surveys. One set 
of critics have been traditional economists who agree that policymakers need information about 
preferences, but are suspicious about surveys.  A different set of critics have been 
environmentalists or political theorists who have no aversion to surveys, polls, and discussions, 
but deny that environmental or other policy issues should be resolved through the monetary 
measures of preferences that CV studies yield. The argument is that policy should be sensitive to 
citizen deliberation: processes where citizens adopt a public-regarding rather than self-interested 
perspective and reach judgments about what policy best serves the public good. CV surveys, 
which ask about exogenous preferences rather than judgments endogenous to the process of 
reasoning about policy, and which use WTP questions that require or at least invite a self-
interested perspective on the part of respondents, have a structure inconsistent with citizen 
deliberation. 
 
The philosopher Mark Sagoff is probably the leading civic republican critic of CV studies 
(and cost-benefit analysis more generally).  In a number of books and articles, Sagoff has argued 
along the following lines: 
 
When individuals participate in the political process to determine the common values and purposes that hold 
them together as a community or as a nation, they regard themselves as judges of public policy, not merely as 
channels or locations at which wants can be found. Debates in which individuals or their representatives 
discuss and decide upon public values need have no analogy, then, with markets where individuals determine 
and pursue personal preferences. In a democracy the application of a cost-benefit formula cannot replace the 
public discussion of ideas; it is not just what the person wants but what he or she thinks that counts.
251 
Similar criticisms of the CV technique are offered by other critics of cost-benefit analysis, most 
recently Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman in a high-profile book, Priceless. 
 
Asking people in a shopping mall about hypothetical scenarios involving bronchitis, or talking to people who 
answer the phone about how much they would pay to protect the bald eagle, amounts to elevating the 
consumer over the citizen.  It also turns the very idea of republican government on its head, suggesting that 
elected representatives should no longer try, through deliberation, reasoning, and debate, to shape the mass of 
                                                 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 164-188. 
251 MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 100 (1988).  This book 
draws on a number of Sagoff’s prior articles. See id. at x.  For more recent statements, drawing a similar distinction 
between consumer preferences and citizen preferences or judgments, see Sagoff, supra note 200, at 213-14; MARK 
SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2-3 (2004).  
56
public opinion into a sensible and lasting set of ideas, but should instead take their marching orders from a 
small sample of nameless individuals who answer a survey. 
252 
 
These quotations exemplify a standard line of critical scholarship about CV studies,
253 but it should 
be noted that the criticisms would also seemingly apply to welfare polls that seek to elicit non-
monetary measures of respondents' self-interested preferences, such as QALY or happiness 
surveys. Indeed, Heinzerling and Ackerman explicitly criticize QALY measures.
254 
 
The civic-republican view of appropriate policymaking that infuses Sagoff s and similar 
criticisms of welfare polls also motivates the proposals for “citizen juries,” “citizen advisory 
committees,” and “deliberative polling” -- what I have termed policy-deliberation formats.  For 
example, James Fishkin, the leading proponent of “deliberative polling,” sees “deliberation” as 
one of the central desiderata for political choice which this survey approach instantiates. By 
deliberation, Fishkin means public-regarding deliberation, or at least deliberation which is open to 
claims about the public good rather than individual interest. “Deliberation” approximates 
Habermas' ideal speech situation: “All arguments deemed relevant by anyone in the discussion are 
given as extensive a hearing as anyone wants and people are willing to consider all the arguments 
offered on their merits.”
255  
 Peter Dienel and Ortwin Renn, who have been active in promoting 
“Planning Cells” (a kind of citizen jury) in Germany, write: “Participants of Planning Cells have 
no defined constituents to whom they are obliged. They are selected to embody and represent the 
interests of all citizens rather than a specific group. It is interesting to note that citizens occupy the 
role of advocates of the common good almost from the beginning of the sessions.”
256  Ned 
Crosby, who has spearheaded the development of “citizen juries” in the United States, argues that 
these embody a “social contract” approach to policy choice, as opposed to a “utility calculation” or a 
“political power” approach.
257  This is (roughly) the familiar distinction between civic 
republicanism, cost-benefit analysis, and interest-group pluralism. 
 
Wendy Kenyon and co-authors, reflecting on the critical literature on CV surveys 
and on the proposals for policy-deliberation formats, write: 
 
Economists and others have suggested that a CV questionnaire asks respondents the wrong question, 
assuming that consumers think about environmental goods (public goods) in the same way as they do about 
private goods ....[T]he use of CJs [citizen juries] as a method of preference revelation allows ... deliberation 
on the environmental issue in terms of what is best for society.
258 
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In short, the civic republican critique can be framed as a contrastive claim: that citizen juries, 
deliberative polls, planning cells, and other policy-deliberation formats, not welfare polls, have 
the appropriate public-regarding structure for citizen involvement in policymaking. 
 
The response to this objection is, I believe, straightforward. Policy-deliberation formats 
and welfare polls are complementary, not mutually exclusive.  Policy-deliberation formats ask 
what an appropriate policy would be; if the answer is that an appropriate policy would be 
sensitive to considerations of well-being, in one or another way, welfare polls can then be 
brought to bear (by the citizens themselves, or by the administrators implementing the citizens' 
policy judgment). 
 
There are a range of possible arguments, intrinsicalist and instrumentalist, for why 
governmental decisions should be informed by policy-deliberation formats.  Intrinsicalist 
arguments say that public-spirited citizen participation is an intrinsic good.  Instrumentalist 
arguments say that policy-deliberation formats advance important purposes that are conceptually 
distinct from participation itself.
259  Some of these arguments are quite plausible, and I will 
assume here that they succeed in demonstrating that policy-deliberation formats should be 
convened to address some subset of governmental decisions. I say "some subset" because, clearly, 
policy deliberation formats can't be used to address all government decisions. These are too 
numerous and, in some cases (most obviously, adjudicative decisions involving particular 
individuals), legal or moral constraints might well preclude the use of such formats.
260 
The subset of governmental decisions appropriately informed by “deliberative polls,” 
“citizen juries,”
 or other policy-deliberation formats might be second-order or first-order 
decisions.
261  
 Second-order decisions concern the decision-procedures that agencies should use in 
issuing regulations, building projects, and making other first-order choices. Congress faces a 
second-order choice in deciding whether to enact a statute that instructs a health and safety agency 
to employ cost-benefit analysis or, rather, some competitor procedure in choosing regulatory 
measures. Congress also faced a second-order choice when it debated the enactment of a generic 
cost-benefit "supermandate." An agency faces a second-order choice in deciding what general 
approach to take in implementing its existing, open-ended, statutory mandate. 
Clearly, second-order policy deliberation formats and welfare polls are complementary, 
not mutually exclusive.
262  For example, a citizens' jury might be convened on the question 
whether an agency should follow a procedure of QALY-maximization; if the jury and the agency 
decide affirmatively, the agency will then (down the line) use QALY surveys. More generally, 
second-order decisions can eventuate in administrative decision procedures that require the 
agency to attend to human welfare, or aspects of welfare. The agency, in line with the citizens' 
recommendation, will implement the welfare-regarding decision procedure, and in doing so may 
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well employ welfare polls. 
First-order policy deliberation formats and welfare polls, too, are compatible – although 
this is a little less obvious. Parenthetically, the case for first-order formats is debatable. As 
Crosby notes, “the [citizens' jury] process works better on value questions” – about the evaluative 
criteria that should guide some subsequent choice – “than technical issues.”
263 
 But let me bracket 
the point and assume that a policy-deliberation format has been convened to determine (say) the 
content of an agency regulation. For example, an environmental agency drafting a pollution-
control regulation for pollutant X might ask a citizens' jury,  “What should be the permissible level 
of pollutant X?”  The citizen jury, if truly deliberative, would not decide that question blindly, 
without mediating concepts. Nor, if truly informed, would it decide the question as a matter of 
common knowledge, without outside data. Instead – civic republicans would surely agree - -- the 
permissible level ought to be picked in virtue of public goals and values, and the jury should 
gather and discuss information so as to determine what pollution level best advances those goals 
and values.  For example, the jury might determine that optimal pollution policy should promote 
overall well-being, should avoid large skews in the distribution of well-being, and should protect 
moral rights.
264  If so, the jury would then need to consult welfare polls as well as revealed 
preference data, to help determine the extent to which lowered pollution levels (via lowered fatality 
risks and fewer diseases) increases overall welfare and (if the effects of pollution are 
disproportionately borne by the poor) diminishes distributive skews. CV or QALY valuations of 
fatality risk and disease would surely be helpful to the jury at this stage in its reasoning process. 
 
Here's one way to put the lesson that, I hope, emerges from the last few paragraphs. The 
civic-republican critics of welfare polls are attacking a caricature. The critics seem to assume that 
the polls are self-bottoming -- that they come into play from the beginning, displacing public-
spirited deliberation. But that is not how welfare polls work, or at least not how they should work. 
Administrative decisionmaking is a kind of legal reasoning that should begin with applicable 
legal sources (statutes, the Constitution, executive orders); should integrate moral considerations 
where legally required or permissible; and should invite citizen participation where legally 
required or where legally permissible and morally required.  At some junctures in this 
complicated reasoning process, the concept of "welfare" or of aspects of welfare (“happiness,” 
“health”) may become relevant.  If weak welfarism, the moral view I defended earlier in this Part, 
is correct, those junctures should be fairly frequent. The entry of "welfare" or its aspects into the 
legal-cum-moral reasoning process may then lead the reasoners to wonder how much some 
outcome or policy affects welfare – and thence to welfare polls. 
 
The self-interested perspective that the respondents to welfare polls are asked to adopt is 
not the starting point for policy. Rather, deliberating citizens or officials should start from an 
impartial starting point; but from that starting point they may deliberate their way to the 
proposition that the effect of policies on the interests of some group of individuals is a legally or 
morally relevant concern.  Reasoning as public-regarding citizens, and bracketing our narrow 
interests, we might conclude that government should (inter alia) be sensitive to the effect of its 
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policies on our narrow interests. This is no more paradoxical than the observation that preference-
utilitarianism or preference-egalitarianism are genuinely moral views even though they construe 
the content of morality in terms of the distribution or the maximization of preference-satisfaction. 
Welfare polls ask respondents to take a self-interested perspective because the informational value 
of these polls is in elucidating what individual interest consists in – information that a fully moral 
and impartial deliberation process might care about. 
 
  A final claim that deliberative democrats might make to criticize welfare polls is the 
following: “There are intrinsicalist moral reasons to encourage citizen participation in government 
– reasons linked to the process of participation itself – and welfare polls do not constitute the sort 
of participation that is intrinsically valuable.”  Is this claim true?  To decide, we’d need a clearer 
conception of the way in which participation is intrinsically valuable.  In particular: Does the 
realization of the intrinsic value truly require participants to adopt a moral perspective, or might 
other perspectives (for example, a self-interested perspective that participants provisionally adopt 
so as to provide information about the nature of well-being) also be acceptable?   But we need not 
pursue these questions.  Even if welfare polling fails the test of intrinsic value, by contrast with 
other citizen-participation mechanisms, the welfare-polling format still has instrumental value.   
It still provides information useful in producing substantively better governmental decisions – for 
all the reasons provided in Parts II and III above.  The intrinsicalist may have good reason to 
encourage deliberative polling or other policy-deliberation formats; but because welfare polls are 
complementary with such formats, not preclusive of them, the intrinsicalist claim is not in fact an 
objection to welfare polls. 
 
V. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WELFARE POLLS 
 
The overwhelming majority of welfare polls, to date, have employed three general formats: 
the CV, QALY, and happiness formats.  This Article has therefore focused on these formats -- 
discussing the role that CV, QALY, and happiness surveys current play in agency decisionmaking 
and other aspects of administrative governance
265; canvassing other possible roles;
266 describing a 
variety of possible improvements to the survey enterprise within this trio of formats;
267 and 
defending welfare polling from objections from two quarters, the “revealed preference” camp 
within economics and the “deliberative democracy” camp within political theory.
268 
 
  But should the trio of CV, QALY, and happiness surveys be changed – perhaps 
supplemented by different welfare polling formats, perhaps even pared back?  The dominance of 
these three approaches is, to a large extent, an historical accident.  CVs originate in the Kaldor-
Hicks view of policy analysis long dominant, despites its flaws, in applied economics.
269  QALYs 
became popular, in substantial part, because public health researchers were disinclined to monetize 
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health and longevity and wanted a scale that was different from the WTP/WTA scale.
270  And the 
rise of happiness surveys is largely a matter of scholarly cycles within psychology, shifting from 
the traditional focus on negative states such as anxiety and depression to include positive states as 
well.
271  Only recently have economists and others with an interest in policymaking latched on to 
happiness surveys. 
 
  Despite their “accidental” origins, CVs, QALYs, and happiness surveys turn out to be a 
vital governmental tool, as discussed.  QALYs and happiness surveys capture important aspects of 
well-being; CVs are yet more inclusive.  But, at a minimum, there is much room to supplement 
these standard welfare-polling formats with new ones – in at least four different ways. 
 
  First, more survey work should be undertaken to characterize the multi-dimensional 
structure of welfare.  Such a characterization is both directly useful in policymaking (for example, 
in clarifying the full range of well-being impacts that, ideally, a cost-benefit analysis or annual 
well-being report should cover), and indirectly useful in guiding the ongoing enterprise of welfare 
polling. 
 
There is a long philosophical tradition, going back to Aristotle, of drawing up lists of the 
different aspects of well-being.
272   Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, and James Griffin are 
prominent contemporary philosophers who have continued this enterprise.  Nussbaum’s list is: life, 
bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of the “senses, imagination, and thought,” the emotions, 
practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other species, play, and control over one’s 
environment.
273  Finnis’ is: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical 
reasonableness, religion. 
274 Griffin’s is: accomplishment, autonomy, understanding, enjoyment, 
and deep personal relations.
275  Philosophers tend to work through reflection and discussion with 
each other, not surveys, and their efforts to describe the multiplicity of well-being dimensions can 
usefully be supplemented through systematic survey work. 
 
  For a rare example of such work, consider the World Health Organization’s efforts to 
develop a questionnaire – the so-called “WHOQOL” instrument – designed to capture all aspects 
of “quality of life,” not just health traditionally conceived.
276   Research groups in 15 different 
countries were involved in the effort.  Each research group conducted focus groups with the 
general population to develop a preliminary list of the “aspects of life that they considered 
contributed to its quality.”
277 Based on these focus groups, a preliminary questionnaire was 
                                                 
270 See Adler, supra note 22, at 14. 
271 See, e.g., Ryan & Deci, supra note 28, at 142. 
272 See, e.g., L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHICS 45-80 (1996); SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS 
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276 See Amy Bonomi et al., Validation of the United States’ Version of the World Health Organization Quality of Life 
(WHOQOL) Instrument, 53 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2000); Silvija Szabo, The World Health Organization 
Quality of Life (WHOQOL) Assessment Instrument, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL 
TRIALS 355 (Bert Spilker ed., 2d ed. 1996); The WHOQOL Group, The World Health Organization Quality of Life 
Assessment (WHOQOL): Development and General Psychometric Properties, 46 SOC. SCI. MED. 1569 (1998). 
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developed, consisting of numerous facets of well-being and matching questions designed to 
determine the respondent’s achievement with respect to each facet.  The preliminary questionnaire 
was administered to at least 300 respondents in each of the 15 countries.  The WHO researchers 
then performed a statistical analysis of this data – for example, looking at correlations within and 
between facets – to arrive at a final facet structure and matching questionnaire.  The final 
WHOQOL structure consists of 24 facets or dimensions of well-being, grouped into 6 domains.   
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Survey work such as the WHOQOL, together with more traditional philosophical efforts 
such as Nussbaum’s, Griffin’s, and Finnis’s, gives policymakers and welfare pollsters an 
overarching framework for categorizing welfare impacts and attendant surveys and metrics.  A 
second, new direction for welfare polling consists in survey work designed to characterize the fine 
structure of particular well-being dimensions.  Consider the WHOQOL domains.  QALY surveys 
typically cover at most the first and third domains and part of the second (omitting positive 
feelings, self esteem, and body image), and wholly ignore the last three.
278  Happiness surveys, if 
focused on the respondents’ positive and negative affects, cover only parts of the first and second 
domains.  If focused on the respondent’s sense of satisfaction with his life, they cover the whole 
WHOQOL map – but only in an indirect way.
279  CVs cover the whole map, but tradeoff biases 
may interfere with monetary valuation of goods such as friendship, self-esteem, and spirituality. 
  
Nonmonetary quantitative measures, such as QALYs, that focus on a subset of the 
WHOQOL dimensions are useful (1) in reducing tradeoff biases and other cognitive distortions 
that may especially affect CVs, and (2) in circumventing the variable marginal utility of money.
 280 
 In theory, both of these benefits could also be realized through an inclusive nonmonetary measure 
– an idea I’ll return to in a moment – but dimension-specific measures such as QALYs have certain 
advantages.  A QALY survey asks the respondent to imagine changes in her health state, holding 
non-health characteristics fixed.  To put this in terms of the WHOQOL, imagine a QALY survey 
that focuses on dimensions 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, which would be reasonably typical.  
These are the “health” facets; the other WHOQOL facets are background facets.  Then the QALY 
survey will instruct the respondent that the number 1 means the best possible state with respect to 
all the health dimensions, together with some set of background characteristics (most 
straightforwardly, the respondent’s actual characteristics), and 0 means the worst possible state 
with respect to all the health dimensions, together with that same set of background 
characteristics.
281  The respondent will then be asked to place an actual or hypothetical health state 
of hers on this 0-1 scale, using some technique such as the standard gamble or time tradeoff.  
Contrast that with an inclusive exercise that tells the respondent that 1 is an ideal state with respect 
to all  the WHOQOL dimensions, and that 0 is the worst possible state with respect to all of the 
WHOQOL dimensions.   Presumably the QALY scale is more sensitive to relatively small 
differences in health states than the more inclusive scale would be.  To give one illustrative 
example: respondents to QALY surveys are able to distinguish angina and pancreatitis (a recent 
                                                 
278 See Adler, supra note 22, at 47-52. 
279 See supra note 54 (describing standard conception of happiness as a mix of positive affect, negative affect, and 
satisfaction with life).  Some happiness surveys focus more on affects, others on satisfaction with life.  See Andrews & 
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280 See supra text accompanying notes 42-43,152. 
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opposed to the worst possible health state.  But the basic point that the QALY approach asks the respondent to vary 
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collection of QALY scores gives angina a score of .75 and pancreatitis a score of .80).
282  Would 
they be able to distinguish between an ideal life marred only by angina and one marred only by 
pancreatitis? 
 
  This is a long-winded way of arguing for the benefits of nonmonetary dimension-specific 
well-being measures such as QALYs.  But presumably those benefits are not unique to the first 
three WHOQOL domains (where we have at least partial coverage, with QALYs and happiness 
surveys) as opposed to the last three.  Social quality-of-life metrics and surveys, corresponding to 
the fourth WHOQOL domain, should be experimented with. These would quantify on a 
nonmonetary scale (e.g., a 0-1 scale analogous to QALYs) the contribution that different sorts of 
social interaction make to well-being.  Ditto for “personal environment” quality-of-life metrics, 
corresponding to the fifth WHOQOL domain, and maybe even spirituality metrics. 
 
  A third avenue for new work in welfare polling involves altering the respondent’s 
perspective.  QALYs, happiness surveys, and CV polls all ask the respondent about her own life.  
QALYs (when administered to laypeople rather than doctors) ask the respondent to compare 
outcomes in which she experiences a given health state with outcomes in which she experiences 
death or perfect health.  Happiness surveys ask the respondent how happy or satisfied she is with 
her life – or, in Kahneman’s framework, how good her current experiences are.
283  CV surveys (if 
appropriately restricted to screen out disinterested preferences) will focus on the respondent’s 
WTP/WTA for changes in the world that affect her.  
 
  The point to see is that welfare polls need not adopt this respondent-centered focus.  In 
principle, a poll might ask the respondent to consider someone else’s life – the life of a 
hypothetical person, or the actual life of some other person – and to express its well-being value on 
some quantitative scale.  Questions of this sort would seem to have both advantages and 
disadvantages vis a vis the current formats.  They might be particularly good at focusing 
respondents on the particular aspects of well-being that the surveyor wants quantified.  (Current 
formats, when asking the respondent about a hypothetical state substantially at variance with her 
actual condition, risk triggering a protest reaction wherein the respondent outright refuses to value 
the hypothetical state or, more subtly, fails to fully consider it).  Relatedly, non-respondent-
centered formats might be particularly effective at encouraging respondents to refine their general 
judgments and views about the nature of well-being (since the task of evaluating their own 
particular lives has been excised), and would be easier to mesh with group-based well-being 
surveys than the current surveys.
284 
   
On the other hand, non-respondent-centered formats risk inviting answers that are not 
welfare-focused.  For example, a respondent asked to rank various health histories of other persons 
might express his judgments about how “healthy” these individuals are in some sense detached 
from well-being, or his moral judgment about a fair allocation of health care resources among 
them, rather than a judgment about the welfare-goodness of the different lives.
285  Whether, on 
                                                 
282 See Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry, 
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283 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61 (discussing Kahneman’s approach to measuring experience). 
284 See supra text accompanying notes 199-203 (discussing possibility of group-based welfare polls). 
285 See supra text accompanying note 109.  
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balance, non-respondent-centered formats provide substantial new well-being information beyond 
that afforded by QALYs, CVs, and happiness surveys is something we can only determine by 
experimenting with these novel formats. 
 
  A fourth and final area for experimentation with new welfare polling formats involves 
developing a genuine interpersonal utility scale.  This scale would be inclusive, covering all the 
dimensions of well-being.  And, ideally, it would be a cardinal scale, capable of representing well-
being levels (crucial for questions about the distribution of well-being) and well-being differences 
(crucial for determining overall well-being).
 286  Imagine that the interpersonal utility scale ranges 
from 0 to 1.  Then, if person A is at level .3 and person B is at level .4, this means that B is better 
off than A.  If a policy changes A’s level to .31 and B’s to .37, this means that the policy decreases 
overall well-being (because the .01-unit positive difference it makes to A’s well-being is less than 
the .03-unit negative difference it makes to B’s). 
  
  Designing surveys to develop an interpersonal utility scale would mean taking a view about 
the meaningfulness and content of interpersonal welfare comparisons – something I have written 
about extensively elsewhere but lack space to discuss at any length here.
287  The short answer is 
that interpersonal comparisons are meaningful and (according to one plausible account deriving 
from work by Harsanyi) reduce to convergent well-informed preferences regarding lotteries over 
possible lives.  Such preferences could, in principle, be elicited through a standard-gamble format 
analogous to the QALY standard-gamble. 1 is the best possible life; 0 the worst possible life; the 
respondent is then asked to contemplate a possible life and to place it on the 0-1 scale by 
expressing the probability p that makes her indifferent as between that life and a p probability of 
the best possible one.
288  Different respondents might express different indifference probabilities 
for a given life – which raises a problem of aggregation.  But that problem is no different from the 
aggregation problem currently faced by QALY surveys.
289  
 
  A more troubling objection, already alluded to, is that the survey protocol just described 
might be cognitively overwhelming for most respondents. QALYs limit the cognitive demand by 
holding fixed non-health dimensions; a parallel but more inclusive format that defined 1 as the 
optimal state with respect to all 24 of the WHOQOL dimensions, and 0 as the worst state with 
respect to all 24, might overtax the imaginative abilities of many humans.  One answer might be to 
use internal consistency checks to screen out responses from those who are overwhelmed; another, 
to use visual aids and other cognitive aids to help respondents grasp the protocol and provide 
meaningful answers;
290 a third, to change format.  What the change of format would be is itself a 
matter for experimentation.  But just as the time-tradeoff method has emerged, within QALY 
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research, as a better technique for eliciting QALY values than the QALY standard gamble – once 
thought to be the gold standard 
291– so the standard-gamble format for eliciting interpersonal utility 
numbers that I have described might not be the most practicable way to do so. If interpersonal 
comparisons are indeed a matter (as per Harsanyi) of preferences over lotteries of possible lives, 
then the standard gamble is theoretically most compelling – but that doesn’t preclude other utility-
elicitation formats that are easier to use and produce values which approximate standard-gamble 
values.
292  
Why an interpersonal utility scale?  We already possess, in dollars, an inclusive scale – one 
that covers all 24 of the WHOQOL dimensions.  Why an inclusive nonmonetary scale?  The 
answer, above all, has to do with the variable marginal utility of money.  WTP/WTA values are 
only a rough measure of changes in well-being.
293  If P is willing to pay $100 for a policy, and Q is 
willing to accept $50 in exchange for the policy, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the policy 
increases overall well-being – that the positive impact on P’s welfare outweighs the negative 
impact on Q’s.  P’s WTP might exceed Q’s WTA because P is wealthier, or an ascetic, or for some 
other reason reaps a relatively small welfare improvement from incremental dollars. 
Despite the imperfect inaccuracy of WTP/WTA amounts in tracking well-being, cost-
benefit analysis is probably the best currently available welfarist policy-analytic tool: either the 
traditional form of cost-benefit analysis that values all impacts with WTP/WTA amounts, or a 
hybrid form that values some using WTP/WTA and others using QALY-to-dollar or similar 
conversions.
294  But survey data valuing welfare impacts on an interpersonal utility scale could be 
very helpful in structuring cost-benefit analysis – for example, by helping set distributive weights, 
or by guiding the choice of QALY-to-dollar or happiness-to-dollar conversion factors.
295   More 
generally, in any context where money values might be skewed by unusually high or low marginal 
utilities, information from interpersonal utility surveys could help recalibrate those values. 
  To sum up: the trio of QALYs, CVs, and happiness surveys can be usefully supplemented 
(1) by  surveys such as the WHOQOL that attempt to characterize the multi-dimensional structure 
of well-being; (2) by dimension-specific analogues to QALYs and happiness surveys, covering 
dimensions such as social life; work life; housing, neighborhood quality, and other aspects of an 
individual’s physical environment; or recreational opportunities; (3) by surveys that ask 
respondents to evaluate others’ lives, not their own; and (4) by survey work to measure welfare 
impacts on an inclusive, nonmonetary, interpersonal utility scale. And what of the thought that 
these novel formats might displace QALYs, happiness surveys, or CVs?  For now, that thought is 
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premature.  In two or three generations, perhaps, welfarist policy analysis might dispense with 
money as its commensurating device and express costs and benefits in terms of interpersonal utility 
units.  But – given the huge amount of information about money values provided by behavioral 
data as well as existing CV studies, and the absence of a comparable body of interpersonal utility 
information – that prospect seems distant.  The enterprise of welfare polling needs to be expanded, 
in the ways suggested in this Part, rather than redirected away from the current three formats that 
have proven so popular.  
CONCLUSION 
 
  Scholarship about law and government sometimes leads, sometimes lags, real advances in 
governance.  The latter is the case, I want to suggest, for CV, QALY, and happiness surveys.  CV 
research now comprises a whole subfield of applied economics, with dedicated practitioners, lots 
of primary surveys, a large secondary literature, and a real role in governmental decisionmaking at 
a number of federal agencies.  QALYs are equally important in the fields of public health and 
health economics, and the results of QALY surveys now frequently figure in cost-benefit analysis 
at the FDA.  Happiness surveys have long been an area of interest for psychologists, and are now a 
“hot topic” for economists.    
 
And yet, at a somewhat higher level of academic generality -- at the level of public-law 
scholarship and political theory, where general normative questions of governmental design are 
pursued -- these survey enterprises have been pretty much ignored.  The contrast with normative 
work on citizen juries, deliberative polling, and other policy-deliberation formats is striking.  Here, 
the quantity of high theory vastly outstrips the actual amount of polling work undertaken, or its 
actual impact to date on governmental decisionmaking. 
  
This Article has sought to redress the theory-practice imbalance.  I have provided a new 
construct -- the welfare poll -- that, I hope, provides a unifying perspective on QALYs, CVs, and 
happiness research.  The construct is useful both in generating recommendations about survey 
practices and governmental applications within this trio of survey formats, and in suggesting new 
formats. 
 
 Welfare polls can provide substantial information about the sources and nature of human 
well-being.  This information is not fully provided by revealed-preference studies, and its legal and 
moral relevance is (I have argued) unimpeachable.  The informational content of welfare polls 
does, of course, depend on the condition of survey respondents: on whether they tell the truth, 
make a sufficient effort, have sufficient facts, have preferences that are not too distorted, 
understand the question asked, are focused on well-being, and so on.  I have systematically 
surveyed these sorts of conditions and have argued that they can be satisfied sufficiently well.   
 
I have also stressed that welfare polls are complementary with, not opposed to, policy-
deliberation formats.  The old duality, of “citizen” versus “consumer,” needs to be transcended.   
The Article, emphatically, is not an attack on citizen juries, citizen advisory commissions, or 
deliberative polls.  But, reciprocally, the theorists of policy deliberation ought to recognize that 
survey instruments that secure information about well-being by inviting respondents to take a self-
interested perspective on policy also are morally and legally defensible.  Why assume that civic-
republican deliberation would end up denying the normative significance of welfare?  The  
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institutions and decision-procedures that incorporate welfare polls -- those described in Part I of 
this Article -- are justifiable on the basis of a view, “weak welfarism,” which citizens impartially 
deliberating about the aims of government surely could endorse.   
 
There is a second, deep link between the existing literature on policy-deliberation formats 
and the defense of welfare polling presented in this Article.  Both embrace the premise that good 
governance will, at some point, require asking people what they think (be it about policy or about 
well-being), and creating favorable motivational, epistemic, cognitive, and communicative 
conditions for this discursive exercise.  Both reject the traditional aversion within economics to 
survey data, and both are committed to improving citizens’ judgments or preferences (about policy 
or well-being) by providing fuller information and by creating discursive structures that will 
encourage rationality, mental effort, and truthfulness.   The development of survey techniques that 
improve preferences or judgments, and the very exercise of questioning citizens – not just 
observing their behavior – are vital to good governance.   These are key premises of my defense of 
welfare polls, and are just as central for the many scholars who have argued in favor of citizen 
juries, citizen advisory commissions, deliberative polls, and other citizen-involving formats for 
policy deliberation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 